The Danish armed forces 1909 - 1918

Between politicians and strategic reality

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The Danish armed forces 1909-1918. Between politicians and strategic reality

Small boy: ‘Danes fighting?’
Soldier: ‘No, we stay outside’
Small boy thinking: ‘Wise.’
Preface

Denmark successfully preserved her neutrality throughout the First World War, and the military supremacy of the German Empire in the West Baltic region was never challenged in earnest by Germany’s enemies. On the surface, the military history of Denmark during the First World War seems a singularly boring theme. However, as the reader of this work will find, a closer look reveals a course of events of high general interest.

The areas of interest can be subsumed under two headings. The first is the military role in preserving neutrality. This has some well known aspects concerning the international political credibility of the neutral armed forces and their long range strategic planning. This was quite problematic in the Danish case. Despite her professed neutrality, Denmark could not be counted among les satisfaits of the European state system; and, on top of this, Denmark was strung out between economic dependence on Great Britain and strategic dominance by Germany. It was not very difficult to imagine Denmark being drawn or pushed away from the neutral stance.

The military role in preserving neutrality also had a short range dimension. The armed forces had to handle the numerous episodes where the activities of the warring powers touched Danish territory. Every such episode posed the threat of rapid erosion of the fragile foundation of Danish neutrality: the preference of the belligerent powers for things as they were. Despite neutrality, this was indeed times of war for the Danish forces in several important respects. As in war, developments lacked predictability and transparency, and false choices carried extreme risks. The forces of the warring powers were not enemies, but they were as unpredictable as an enemy in war, and might be turned into enemies by a false move.

The second area of interest is the relationship between the political and military leadership. This had a special character due to the fact that the Danish government was formed by a party which had anti-militarism and disarmament high on the agenda, but did not command a parliamentary majority. What we see is a very early example of the complex relationships which strictly constitutional democratic government can produce. It was unusually visible that the military was in a multiple role as a branch of government, a locus of expertise, and a social group with specific interests and value systems. In the belligerent states, the strain of the war produced conflicts and often remarkable redistributions of power within
the political and military leadership. In Denmark, tension around the role of the military as such presaged a theme which became important in many states during the twentieth century.

_Gunner Lind_

_To the memory of Tage Kaarsted.
He created the foundation and inspired the work._
The domestic political framework and the armed forces

Optimism met cynical pessimism in Danish elite views of the future. The divided mix of attitudes approached the situation elsewhere in Europe in the last decade before the Great War.

One side agreed with the liberal mix of belief and hope that civilisation was moving to a new level. Hereafter the international scene would be dominated by economic interaction and competition among the powers rather than war. Common sense and widespread understanding that a future major war would threaten the whole basis of the societies, the world order and civilisation would keep governments away from sliding over the brink into open conflict. They realised that the consequences of a major war would be disastrous as concluded by Ivan Bloch in the work published in shortened form in English as ‘Is War Now Impossible?’ in 1899. Hereafter reason would reign.

The other side suspected - and in essence accepted - that any future development of civilisation depended on the natural and thus legitimate effort of dynamically rising new nations like the Germans, the Americans and – even – the ‘yellow’ Japanese. They would grow and develop by taking or inheriting land and other resources from old, tired waning nations like the British and from the underdeveloped Slavs. The resulting wars would serve to weed out weakness from humanity. War was a ‘biological necessity’ - as General Friedrich von Bernhardi had argued in his 1911 book published in English in 1914 as ‘Germany and the Next War’. Small nations would be absorbed in the process. Fortunately - but probably unfortunately for Denmark - nature would rule.

Denmark might disappear completely from the map of Europe as the result of neighbour ambition or great power perception of strategic necessity. The very real risk had been highlighted twice during the previous 100 years, in 1814 and again fifty years later. The events of 1864 had been a brutally clear demonstration of the limitations of Danish military power. The experience of defeat was being absorbed at a time of deepening public enmity towards Germany due to its increasingly hard pressure to control and Germanise the Danish minority in North Schleswig. The experience and the enmity were the roots of all Danish national security discussion and action of the period. However, even if the main security problems
were related to Germany, they were not necessarily limited to that country. The brutality in war of even liberal and democratic states like Britain had been highlighted by the unprovoked bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807 and recently in the Boer War.

The defence issue had been the selected field for the political struggle for and against a parliamentarian system from 1876 to 1901. Thereafter a mixed political-military commission (the ‘1902 Defence Commission’) had been established to develop a consensus, compromising between the two sides’ different views of the right defence posture.\footnote{One position was represented by the army leadership, with their supporting Conservative politicians and the increasingly sympathetic Moderate Liberals (‘Det moderate Venstre’). These soldiers and politicians were convinced that the defence of neutral Denmark had to include the continuation and modernisation of all parts of Copenhagen Fortress, both the coastal artillery works and the half-circle of permanent land fortifications. To carry out an extended defence against an invader was a matter of duty both as a neutral country and as a nation. For officers and Conservatives it was also a question of national honour.

The other view was represented by the now strongest part of the liberals. The Liberal Reform Party (‘Venstrereformpartiet’) accepted the modernisation of the coastal defence system meant to protect Copenhagen against naval bombardment. It also accepted the requirement for defence against a limited force coup landing.

The party rejected keeping or modernising the permanent land side fortifications. A large, modern fortress would cost too much. A proper national defence should not be limited to a small corner of the country. The defence forces should represent and draw upon the ‘living’ and enthusiastic masses of free men, organised in mobile units, defending as much of the country as realistically possible. For many liberals, the Swiss militia system was the ideal, but most accepted the Danish compromise with its short basic conscript training of only a part of the annual class. It would be expensive to train, arm and equip everybody.

The liberal leaders understood that it would be impossible to defend all parts of the country equally well. They approved the dedication of the largest part of the field army to the defence of the main island, Zealand. They accepted in principle that this would mean the establishment of new garrisons on the island to facilitate and expedite field army concentration and combat readiness.
Most liberals acknowledged that a neutral state had the obligation to fight with visible determination to prevent its territory and resources from being used by the belligerents against each other. Therefore they emphasised the need to deter serious violations of neutral Danish land and sea territory by forward presence and direct defence.

The navy leadership found it easy to agree with the Liberal Reform Party’s emphasis on forward defence of neutrality.

After a rather leisurely work pace during the initial fact-finding years, the work of the Defence Commission was accelerated towards a conclusion during the period 1905-08. The Liberal Reform Party under Jens Christian ‘IC’ Christensen as Prime Minister and Defence Minister decided to accept stable defence spending as part of the government programme. The decision led to the separation of the left wing of the party, thereby freeing the Prime Minister to become the effective leader of the defence reform process.

In order to improve the information basis for decisions about a new defence arrangement, Christensen accepted clandestine contacts with Helmuth von Moltke, the new Chief of the German General Staff.

Within the framework of the German post-1905 preparations for war (with their initial main offensive effort against France, very limited forces

*The liberal leader
Jens Christian (I.C.) Christensen.*

*The father of the 1909 defence system*
Moltke was eager to give Christensen what he hoped for. The two countries had a common interest in an accord. A credible Danish political commitment to neutrality in spite of the territorial and national grievances combined with a matching defence posture - also directed against the British - would make the planned German initial operations a little less risky. It would become more likely that the nearly undefended ‘Northern Front’ would remain inactive.

During the contacts, Moltke therefore sought and got a promise that Denmark would stay neutral and never side with Germany’s enemies, in spite of the basic disagreement about North Schleswig. Christensen on his side got a clear impression that a German action against Denmark was not automatic. If Germany trusted Danish neutrality and the country’s will to resist Germany’s enemies’ use of its territory, Denmark might be left alone.

The defence plan proposed by the Liberal Reform Party was therefore not only designed to counter any attempt to force Denmark to take sides by coup landing or bombardment of the capital. It was also intended to oppose belligerent use of Danish territory, ports or inner territorial waters to gain control of the Straits or as a base for operations into the Baltic Sea.

Due to the still limited range of the naval combatants until oil replaced coal as the main naval fuel after the Great War, a protected forward anchorage was needed for coaling by any outside navy - like the Royal Navy - operating through the Danish narrows into the Baltic Sea.

Due to the increasing size and draught of even the pre-Dreadnought battleships, the coasts and territorial waters of the Great Belt were considered the key areas for the belligerents. Thus these areas had to be given the highest priority in the Danish defence effort. Both army and navy should make their forces in the Great Belt area strong enough to discourage violations.

However, before Christensen could fully convince the parliamentary majority and press or manipulate the army to live with this strategic understanding as the basis for the new defence arrangement, political disaster struck, drastically weakening its driving force. The Minister of Justice Peter Alberti admitted having committed massive fraud. Even if the Prime Minister had not been personally involved, he had trusted and supported Alberti. The King felt misinformed, and his first minister had to leave office. The armed services leaders considered that Christensen had ‘lost his honour’ and thus the legitimate authority to govern.
Even if I.C. Christensen stayed as party leader and returned as Defence Minister to ensure passage of the new defence laws in parliament, he no longer had the political strength to ensure that implementation would be directed by the premises of the laws. For this reason the focus was diluted during the work of developing the recommendations of the Defence Commission into legislation. The result became an unclear compromise with the Conservatives and Moderates, who tried to keep and modernise the Copenhagen Land Fortress. Keeping the land fortress with its artillery units within an already too small budget made the 1909 defence system even more under funded that it would otherwise have been.

During the next years the country missed a political force consistent and powerful enough to ensure a clear strategic focus of the defence preparations. A security and defence concept based on deliberate attention to identified German military threat perceptions was never accepted by those implementing the laws. I.C. Christensen's contacts with the German General Staff had been clandestine and would have been considered half-treason at the time. Hence the strategic concept behind the laws was only suspected – and disagreed with by most.

The Defence Ministers between 1909 and 1920 were either from the Moderate Liberals or from the Social Liberal Party. The former implemented the defence laws in partial, but unacknowledged, disagreement with their strategic logic. The latter had separated from the Liberal Reform mother party in opposition to I.C. Christensen's defence policy to form a new party. The party, ‘Det radikale Venstre’, considered the new laws harmful to Danish security. Neither group agreed with Christensen's defence concept. It became an unappreciated orphan.

When the Social Liberals first came to power from autumn 1909 to summer 1910, the party used the Alberti scandal to take their revenge for the 1905 events. Christensen was impeached, and even if he was not convicted, the impeachment undermined his joy of politics and thereby destroyed the dynamic will behind the defence arrangement.  

The Social Liberals considered defence forces and preparations not only an unnecessary waste of money, but an anachronistic source of stupid, harmful and unjust influence on young men. Civilisation had fortunately moved to a stage where it was extremely unlikely that a great power war could happen in Europe.

If, however, a big war did happen, the less military capabilities a small state like Denmark had accumulated the better. Military forces and forti-
fications would make the small state visible to the belligerents. Military preparations would create or increase great power strategic interest in its territory. Without a strong Danish fleet to draw them to Copenhagen, the British would not have bombarded the city in 1807. Significant military forces would encourage both politicians and population to believe that something could be gained from the use of forces and fortifications in defence against a great power invasion. All small power defence against a great power was obviously hopeless. 1864 should have made that clear to everybody. The maximum that could be done would be to register the violation. The Social Liberals felt no responsibility for preventing the use of Danish territory and resources by one belligerent against another. Thus the neutral small state had no obligation to defend its neutrality; to mark the fact of the violation and protest was sufficient. Everything should be done to avoid the real evil; a war in your country. If invaded, the nation should rely on its inner cultural strength to survive.

The Social Liberals returned to power in the summer of 1913, promising the King not to change the defence arrangement. The key person in the government from our point of view was the impressive social liberal statesman Peter Munch. He remained Defence Minister until 1920. He had been the leader of the 1905 drafting and refining of the party’s position on national security, neutrality and defence. The result of his work had been a national security and defence paradigm in fundamental conflict with the basic understanding of the armed services and the political centre and right parties. The King was surprised by Munch’s appointment. The new Prime Minister had to promise that the Defence Minister would not do anything to undermine the authority of the officer corps and its responsibility for military discipline. It is unclear if the promise was communicated to Munch at the time. He certainly did not feel bound by the commitment until his actions provoked a serious confrontation with the army chief in early 1915, where the King forced the government to live up to its promise by supporting the general.

When the war came in August 1914, the minority Social Liberal government accepted that it had to administer the national defence system according to the letter of the 1909 legislation. It realised that an open domestic political division on the defence issue would send a potentially dangerous signal to the belligerents. Thus most of the defence force reserves were called up. The navy and the army coastal defence mobilised fully, the rest of the army only partially.
Two out of the three planned controlled naval mine fields north and south of Copenhagen were laid, and during the first couple of months Copenhagen Fortress was reinforced with large field and semi-permanent works. A part of the Zealand field army was deployed outside Copenhagen with the detachment of small forces to guard or observe the most exposed harbours and threatened parts of the East and West Zealand coasts.

The start of German-British hostilities on 5th August led to a German request to Denmark to block the Great Belt with mines against both sides. The request was seen by most members of the Danish political and military leadership as an ultimatum, and during the next few days two mine barriers were laid, leaving the ferry route between Zealand and Funen open and partially protected between them. About half the operational vessels of the navy were deployed to the Belt to guard and service the barriers and assist the civilian shipping through the open channel close to the western, Funen side of the Belt.

The Great Belt barrier had been established in direct contradiction to the defined neutrality rules. They assumed that it was a Danish obligation to ensure free passage for the belligerents.

The Little Belt was blocked by a Danish minefield in a way that left the strait completely open to German use.

The army only left very limited forces in Jutland. Fully mobilised they would reach the strength of a lightly supported infantry division. The Jutland army would deploy subunits to guard and if necessary block the most important ports as well as a light force screen to monitor the land border with Germany.

During the Great War Denmark’s situation was in many areas similar to that of the Netherlands, and different from that of the neighbouring countries Sweden and Norway. Both Denmark and Holland had to find a way to accommodate an overwhelming German military power just across the border. German forces might be released for invasion either by operational level requirements – for army transit through Dutch Limburg or naval requirements for effective presence in the Kattegat and Skagerrak – or as a response to British likely or de facto use of the state territory. Both countries were traditional trading, maritime nations. Both countries had the advantage - and risk - of serving as a way for Germany to bypass the British blockade. Both were saved from involvement in the war by British military realism and the fact that German needs never outweighed the estimated disadvantages of invading. In the case of Holland the catastrophe
was close. Only the timely fall of Fortress Liège at the start of the war made transit through Dutch Limburg unnecessary. Both found it impossible to import or produce modern equipment for their armed forces. Both had to mobilise and regulate the economies and societies as did the belligerents. In both countries the different pressures from the war eventually led to social disturbances, worst in Holland. The two armies had roughly the same operational concepts, but the domestic defence policy framework differed. In Holland the political leadership emphasised and enforced deployment for a neutrality defence in all directions similar to I.C. Christensen’s conceptual basis for the Danish 1909 defence laws. However, in Denmark the social-liberal government in power rejected throughout the war the idea that small state defence forces could deter any deliberate great power belligerent action. In Holland the strong joint and army commander maintained the support of the Queen. In Denmark the King gradually gave up supporting the army commander from 1915 to 1917.
The navy – expectations, realities and adjustments

During the thirty years after the 1864 defeat, the navy’s place in the Danish national defence had been marginal. As a small country Denmark was no longer able to maintain a force of capital ships large enough to influence significantly a great power’s operations close to its shores. The cost of major combatants and the very fast development and obsolescence of maritime technologies made this impossible. Instead the national effort was concentrated on creating a fortified last ditch defence around Copenhagen with the navy’s major vessels as an integrated element.

Thereafter the situation gradually improved. The steady move towards parliamentary democracy led to increasing political support for armed forces designed primarily to defend the neutrality at the territorial borders. In that mission Danish geography made the navy contribution essential. From the mid-1890’s the Liberal reaction to the army’s support of the political Right during the previous two decades made it possible for the Danish Navy to get the necessary funds for its first and only family of coastal artil-
lery ships. The general spirit of navalism\textsuperscript{17} of the time probably helped to weaken the traditional Liberal resistance to the navy’s wish to acquire large and therefore expensive armoured artillery vessels.

Parallel with the pro-navy political developments and the helpful time spirit, new technological developments opened opportunities for effective naval contributions to national defence, as emerging types of weapons were favoured by local conditions. The maritime geography of Denmark was ideal for mine warfare. Small torpedo boats could use the shallow waters, small islands and irregular fiords for protection and new auto-mobile torpedoes for attack, especially at night.

Technologically alert Danish naval officers realised early the potential of the diving torpedo boat – a submarine. From 1909 onwards the best young officers sought service in the submarine flotilla that grew quickly under the dynamic professional and bureaucratically effective leadership of future navy chief, Commander\textsuperscript{18} Hjalmar Rechnitzer. These officers understood that there were no existing effective weapons against the submarine. For the first time in decades the navy could have a relative cheap weapon with the ability to actively seek and seriously harm a great power squadron operating against Denmark. A group of submarines was like a mobile and flexible mine field that sought after the enemy and that could not be swept in advance.

During the last years before the war the navy worked hard and successfully to develop a submarine force large enough to present a significant threat to an invasion or bombardment fleet in the Sound south or north of Copenhagen.

Until his death of diabetes in April 1918, the navy was dominated by the personality and vision of its chief, Vice-Admiral Kofoed-Hansen. His commanding position was recognised outside the country. At his burial – which took

\textit{The commander of the Danish Navy, Vice-Admiral Otto Kofoed-Hansen.}\textsuperscript{19}
place during the potentially decisive final German offensives on the Western Front - both Emperor Wilhelm II and King George V joined the Norwegian King Haakon VII in expressing sympathy with the Danish Navy on its loss.  

The tough, brilliant and outspoken Otto Kofoed-Hansen had acted as the navy representative on the 1902 Defence Commission during the key definition period. He became chief of the navy in the autumn of 1911. Having earlier led the high technology mine branch, he was alert to the possibilities of mines and torpedo craft in Danish waters. The admiral’s analysis of the naval balance of power between the Royal Navy and German High Seas Fleet in the North Sea led him to regard a British attempt to enter the Baltic with a major squadron early in a German-British war as a highly risky and therefore unlikely event. Thus Denmark had to face reality: she would have to accept German domination until a major Royal Navy victory in the North Sea had reduced the German High Seas Fleet enough to allow a Royal Navy entry attempt into the Baltic Sea.

As a de facto hostage to German military power, Denmark should use its forces in a way that paid visible attention to voiced German operational level concerns. If Germany considered a British landing in Jutland a possibility, Danish forces should deploy to create an obstacle to a British violation of Danish Neutrality, no matter the extremely small probability of such an occurrence.

In reality the British forces never seriously considered an operation via Jutland towards the Kiel Canal. The limitations and difficulties were fully understood by Jacky Fisher’s Royal Navy. The only option discussed was the establishment of an offshore base on the Horns Reef west of Esbjerg, using nets and scuttled ships. It was considered in the autumn of 1909 and thereafter dropped. However, aggressive statements and rumours were used to encourage Germany to divert attention from ship construction to coastal defences and help the Royal Navy in its bureaucratic struggle against the British Army. The possible negative effects on Denmark could not be helped.  

Kofoed-Hansen was no discreet or diplomatic traditional service bureaucrat. His arguments were presented forcefully to the public. In May 1909 - in the period between the Defence Commission Report and the passage of the 1909 defence legislation - he had published his controversial views in the small publication ‘Foreign Policy and Defence. A Condensed Description of the Defence Issue and its Current State – May 1909.’ He rejected both what he called the Social-Liberal ‘Defence Nihilism’ and
any attempts to create an effective defence against Germany that in reality tried to establish a British bridgehead for operations against Germany. Both options would force Germany to invade Denmark to protect its strategic interests. A credible defence of Danish neutrality had to include a direct protection of the parts of the territory likely to be affected by future wars because of their direct importance to the belligerents.

In many ways the admiral was in line with I.C. Christensen. However, he disagreed with Christensen's and other politicians' assumption of an acute strategic competition between German and British naval power in the Great Belt. The situation of 'balance' with both navies operating in Danish waters might only come after a German naval defeat in the North Sea. The admiral also differed from Christensen in relation to the role of the Fortress. Kofoed-Hansen insisted that an invasion, German or Allied, if it actually did happen, should be met with an extended resistance, at the end based on Copenhagen. To Kofoed-Hansen national honour demanded a tough and extended defence effort, a view considered anachronistic by an increasing number of Danish politicians.

Outline proposed operations plan against the Royal Navy: Wenck's prize essay of late 1910

Naval operational plans can rarely be reconstructed in the same ways as those of land forces. The mobility of naval forces makes it easier to react in a flexible way to enemy actions within the range of own forces. The only fully documented defence preparations of the Danish Navy of the period were those linked to mine barriers designed to protect Copenhagen. The area was too small and the available forces ended up in 1909 as too limited for Danish naval operations to require forward logistical preparations ashore that could indicate to posterity how the navy planned to fight.

However, in spite of this basic handicap for naval historians it is possible to reconstruct the thinking of the small Danish naval officer elite of the time. In December 1910, the newly promoted lieutenant-commander Henri Lucian Erik Wenck handed in his prize essay about the use of torpedo boats in war and the implications for operations in the North Sea and Danish Waters to the navy’s professional debating society23, ’The Naval Lieutenants’ Society’24 Wenck became chief of the Navy two decades later. He served as Chief of the Navy Staff from 8th August 1914 until the end of the war.
The concluding part of the essay was given in a confidential annex. Wenck expected that the Royal Navy would observe the German coast with light forces, backed by groups of cruisers. Rosyth was assumed to be the main Royal Navy base during the first part of the war. Submarines would operate from bases along the British east coast. It would be an advantage to the Royal Navy to get control of a forward torpedo boat base, either by occupying Borkum or by using a Dutch port. The likely dense German mine barriers along the North Sea coast would severely hamper Royal Navy offensive operations. However, the offensive spirit of the service would make it search for a solution (such as the Horns Reef offshore base considered in 1909).

Wenck argued that the German Navy would also seek offensive solutions. This was clear not only from its tactical instructions. In 1909 the State Secretary von Tirpitz made it clear to the German Parliament that the light forces should not be seen in isolation. They would prepare the German battle fleet offensive. Germany would use offensive mining, submarines and torpedo boats against the British coast, including the Thames Estuary, in order to develop a better balance of forces. The enlargement of the Kiel Canal was assumed to be completed in 1915.

British operations in Danish waters would take place within the framework of the naval war after the German Navy had been weakened by a major defeat in the North Sea. When the Royal Navy did enter the Kattegat, either Britain or Germany would present an ultimatum to Denmark. Wenck expected Denmark to choose the German side. Danish armed forces were assumed mobilised at the beginning of the great power war. At the start of the offensive, the Royal Navy would occupy the Kattegat islands of Læsø, Anholt, Hesselø, Sejerø and Hjelm for use as bases. From that moment onwards Danish forces would operate actively against the British forces entering from the north. In agreement between the Ger-
man and Danish governments German forces would reinforce the defence of Jutland and Funen. Germany would accept the main responsibility for the defence of the Great and Little Belt, and would reinforce the Danish naval forces near Copenhagen with coastal defence ships and establish a heavy coastal defence howitzer battery North of Helsingør. Other German and Danish coastal batteries would be constructed at the Great Belt at Knudshoved, Halskov and on the island of Sprogø. Massive active minefields would be laid in the Kattegat.

The operational part of the Danish Navy (‘Farvandseskadren’) would operate from the waters around the island of Samso. The island would be defended by the Danish Army from new field fortifications. Thus the Danish Navy would actually operate as a forward force for the German Navy.

Wenck suggested use of the new larger and thus faster Danish torpedo boats in nightly sallies against the Royal Navy battle squadron assumed to be in the Skagerrak, thereafter returning to protection in the Limfjord, entering either through Thyborøn from the west or Hals from the east. The alternative would be the use of the other north-east Jutland fiords (Mariager and Randers Fiord) or neutral Swedish or Norwegian waters. In the future the operations of the larger torpedo boats could be supplemented by Danish submarines.
The Society’s evaluation committee was composed of more senior naval officers. They were impressed. The written evaluation that followed in February 1911 had only minor critical comments about Wenck’s assumptions about the initial Royal Navy actions. It implicitly accepted the analysis of operations in Danish waters.

Wenck received the prize. The official evaluation of the study by the Naval Staff Chief, Naval Captain Thomas Vilhelm Garde, followed in November 1911. The new Navy Staff was responsible for all naval war planning and preparations to the designated wartime Commanding Admiral, now Kofoed-Hansen.

Garde praised the work and recommended a substantial Navy Ministry cash reward. However, he did criticise Wenck’s use of the torpedo boats as too offensive and optimistic. They should not be risked in ambitious sallies against the enemy battle squadron. Instead the Danish boats should await the situation as a ‘fleet-in-being’ and operate against the enemy forward cruisers as these exposed themselves. In December Garde notified the Society that Wenck had received his money.

When the navy established the mine barrier in the Great Belt following the German request on 5th August 1914, Captain Garde was given command of the half of the navy deployed to maintain and defend those fields. During his one year in Great Belt command, he prepared himself to act according to his critique of Wenck’s concept: conducting cautious operations against the forward elements of an enemy fleet, thereby reducing the risks for own forces as much as possible. His reactive approach and deliberate attempts to avert risk led to a direct conflict with Kofoed-Hansen.

The strangest and least convincing part of Wenck’s scenario was the idea that the Germans would let the weak Danish forces act as a buffer between the German Navy and the British forces entering through the Skagerrak.

When the German navy updated their pre-1905 operational plans against Denmark from August 1916, it did include a massive mine barrier.
in the Kattegat. However, the Danish Navy were simply forced to keep out of the way, staying inside the harbours mined from the start of the operation. Various new mine fields would be established to prevent the Danish torpedo boats and submarines from interfering with German operations in the Kattegat and Western Baltic. The minefields in the Great Belt would be cleared under the guns of two German battleships. Samsø was to be used as a forward naval base, but by Germans.

The German High Seas Fleet would enter the Kattegat from the Little Belt after the transit through the Kiel Canal. During the previous days a large number of small mine fields would be laid in the northern part of the Kattegat to delay any British operations and put pressure on Denmark to behave prudently. At the same time German Navy airships would start regular flights over Copenhagen ‘for moral reasons’. When Danish merchant ships hit the mines, the message would be reinforced. If Denmark resisted the German violation of its neutrality, Copenhagen would be exposed to an aerial bombardment. The attack on the capital was meant to fix the army, encouraging it not to reinforce the defence of Jutland. Initially a naval bombardment of the capital had been part of the plan; however, eventually the option was dropped due to the risk to the battleships. Any local attempt to resist requisition would be met by naval bombardment of the port city. The view of the Danish navy as irrelevant to German combat operations lived on to 1940.

**Actual planning, mainly against the ‘less likely’ aggressor Germany**

Early 1912 the Danish Navy Staff had started planning operations in defence of neutrality in a major war. In a report to the Ministry about the major naval exercises in 1911, Garde divided the neutrality defence missions in two categories: the ‘likely’ ones and the ‘less likely’ ones. The former were directed against states with interests incompatible with Danish neutrality (read Great Britain). The latter were directed against states that might accept or even want to extend Danish neutrality out of self-interest (read Germany). By using these categories Captain Garde paid lip-service to Kofoed-Hansen’s strategic view.

The 1911 squadron exercises had been within the ‘less likely’ framework. In a September 1915 scenario the Danish Navy attempted to counter a German surprise landing of around 12,000 troops in Køge Bay. It was aimed at interdicting the Danish army mobilisation and concentration to Copenhagen. The coup force was carried in 22 transports, protected by
a squadron of 5 battleships, 3 cruisers and a force of torpedo boats. The unsuccessful Danish naval attempt to block the landing included the planned mining of the Bay as well as the attack of three coastal defence ships and four submarines. The landing force bypassed the Danish counter-bombardment mine barrier.32

Even if declared ‘less likely’ by the new navy chief, the naval defence preparations against Germany continued. Early February 1912 brought a standing order approved by the Navy Ministry describing naval operations in defence of neutrality. ‘If the conditions indicate the risks of a surprise attack or landing – we primarily think of an enemy expedition from the south directed against Amager or Køge Bay, however, an operation from the North might also be considered – the senior vessel commander present must use the available force to monitor the suspicious force and intervene, when the hostile intent is indisputable. ... it must, however, be kept in mind that there is no war, Therefore force cannot be used against ships of another state, unless these commit indisputable hostile acts, such as: a) when ships of war enter Danish territorial waters in places where they have no legitimate business, especially when this happen under the cover of darkness or fog, after having been warned by a Danish vessel, or if they convoy transports or merchant ships seeming to carry troops. b) when transports or merchant ships anchor in Danish territorial waters, or of course c) when they disembark troops on Danish territory or so close that it is obvious that Danish territory is their objective, d) when the ship of another state acts in a hostile way against a Danish vessel. ...’ 33

In mid 1912 the Navy Staff developed plans to use the new Danish submarines in the Sound in a way that did not conflict with the use of the mine barriers. Navigation marks visible through a periscope should be erected to make submerged deployment from the base in Copenha-
gen possible. Any minefields forward of the planned bombardment barriers - e.g. fields in the northern and southern parts of Køge Bay and in the northern part of the Sound - should be placed parallel to the coasts as pure anti-invasion barriers. It should be easy to disarm part of the controlled anti-bombardment barriers to allow passage of the submarines.35

At the same time the Navy Staff informed the Vice-Admiral about the planned revision of the Navy’s operations plan. The existing plan had only covered operations against Germany. The staff observed that the strategic situation made an attempt by the Western Powers to penetrate into the Baltic Sea still more unlikely, ‘...on the other hand it cannot be denied that against a demoralised opponent it is an option to use Norwegian or Danish territory to conduct operations against the Baltic Sea with light craft, and especially submarines. By conducting such minor operations it would be possible with a relatively minor effort to apply a considerable pressure against Germany by the increased risks linked to the Baltic Sea traffic.’

These were observations of acute foresight. However, they did not lead to directives or practical preparations in the autumn of 1914 when the presence of Royal Navy submarines in Danish waters gave indications of the correctness of the prediction, even if the enemy was far from demoralised.

The Navy Staff made clear to the admiral that even if any naval operational planning within the framework of a strategic defensive had to be incomplete, a ‘Plan for the Employment of the Navy’ had been missed during the joint planning with the Army General Staff.36 Army officers could never comprehend the inherent flexibility of naval forces. Garde knew that the navy had to produce plans on paper to convince the General Staff of its professionalism.

**Balkan War crisis**

The late autumn 1912 Balkan War led to crisis meetings in the Danish ‘Defence Council’ chaired by Klaus Berntsen, the Prime and Defence Minister. During the 16th November meeting the chiefs of the two armed services each gave their analysis of the situation.

Kofoed-Hansen was clear, consistent and had a very good understanding of reality. The crisis could lead to a war that included a German-British conflict. However, it was difficult to see what Britain would gain from a war. Germany would benefit from waiting. Its position would improve in the near future. She could build nearly as many Dreadnoughts as Britain, and
Kofoed-Hansen expected in November 1912 that Germany would await the opening of the Kiel Canal for new Dreadnought-size battleships like the SMS Ostfriesland after the widening work started in 1907.³⁸

the enlarged Kiel-Canal would open in 1-1½ years. He underlined that Danish neutrality was compatible with German interest. However, he did warn against a too fussy enforcement of Danish neutrality against early minor German violations of the rules of presence in Danish territorial waters. Initially Germany would be in full control of the Baltic Sea and Danish waters. During the early period the threat against Denmark would be limited by the lack of surplus German land forces. All available troops would be needed on the two main fronts with few available for secondary tasks. Danish neutrality would be incompatible with British interests if she made the decision to enter the Baltic. She would have to use Danish territory to
support operations from Kattegat onwards. The only place in Denmark that might be threatened by Britain early in a war would be Esbjerg. Therefore the neutrality defence here should be prepared in peacetime. According to the admiral, the main weakness of the Danish defence system was the lack of a standing force in the army. Therefore an early call-up of the Neutrality Guard Force (‘Sikringsstyrken’) was essential.  

One month later, on 20th December 1912, the Royal Decree on Danish Neutrality followed. It had been developed in consultation with Sweden and Norway. Belligerent war ships were forbidden use of Danish ports and inner territorial waters. However the ‘natural traffic routes’ to the Baltic Sea were open. The combatants were allowed innocent passage of Danish waters, however staying on the territory for more than 24 hours was only authorized in emergencies. The belligerent forces were forbidden to use Danish ports or territorial waters as bases. The use of wireless or other communication from Danish territory was forbidden as was the placing of supply ships, colliers, in the inner territorial waters.

As Germany could cover all Danish territorial waters from its own bases in the Western Baltic, the rules were in effect directed against the Royal Navy. 

**Final 20 months of preparations, mainly against Germany**

During the months that followed, the navy and joint navy-army defence preparations continued. In February 1913 the commander of the seaward defences of Copenhagen outlined the navy’s reaction if a (German) sea landing took place in Køge Bay south of the capital. A major part of the navy would be employed, and the southern approaches along the coast might be mined.

This defence option was exercised during the joint exercises in August-September between the commander of the Copenhagen seaward defences and the operational navy squadron. In the post-exercise memorandum sent to the Ministry of the Navy, the Chief of Staff underlined that he actually saw that option as the more likely, and he underlined that the seaward defence would be influenced by Swedish policies and actions. A fleet might bombard Copenhagen from Swedish territorial water or during passage through the Swedish part of the Sound.

In June 1913 the Chief of Navy Staff sent the next part of the draft navy operations plan to the admiral. The part from the previous summer had dealt with defence against Germany just prior to or after the formal state of war between Germany and Great Britain. This new draft plan covered
six different types of violations by Western Powers as well as an attack by Germany later in the war. Captain Garde underlined that the draft was only a first attempt to write an operations plan.\textsuperscript{42}

In November 1913 the Navy Staff underlined to the army General Staff that the coastal fort artillery would not be able to prevent a naval bombardment of the capital. The range of the heavy artillery of the Royal and German High Seas navies was simply too great. Thus the defence had to include the use of a combination of forward mine fields, torpedo boats and submarines. The most important contribution would be the submarines. Six were now available or becoming operational and another six were being built. The employment of the boats would significantly reduce the risk of bombardment.\textsuperscript{43}

Until August 1914, the navy clearly saw the Sound as the key area of operations. The mission here was to counter attempts to bombard or land troops close to the capital. However, the navy did realise the importance of the inner territorial water bordering the eastern side of the Great Belt, the ‘Smålandsfarvandet’. The defence laws foresaw the development of the narrows between the main island of Zealand and the archipelago in the south into a forward deployment area and a transit route between the Sound and the Great Belt protected by permanent coastal batteries and controlled mine fields. A forward protected anchorage would later be established at the small islands Agersø and Omø in the north-western parts of the Smålandsfarvandet.

In Agersø and Omø in the north-western parts of the Smålandsfarvandet. In the summer of 1914 the first of these new coastal batteries authorised was under construction at Masnedø off the south coast of Zealand. As a first step to use the new possibilities, the navy had prepared the deployment of a small force with a ‘division’ of three torpedo boats and two submarines to Masnedsund to have a small force present for operations at the south-west coast of Zealand and in the Great Belt. Late July fuel for the vessels was sent to Masnedø, both coal for the torpedo boats and fuel oil for the submarines.\textsuperscript{44}

\textbf{July- August crisis: deployment as planned}

During the crisis in late July and early August up to the state of war between Germany and Great Britain became reality, the navy acted as already planned. The situation only changed with the German 5\textsuperscript{th} August morning
request to Denmark to mine the Great Belt. On 29th July Kofoed-Hansen asked the ministry for permission to concentrate the navy at Copenhagen and to start preparing the conscript summer-training fleet squadron for combat. The submarine flotilla was just returning from its first visit to the Baltic Sea island of Bornholm. The next day the training squadron anchored north-east of Amager in a position where it could co-operate with the Copenhagen coastal forts.

On the evening of 31st July the Danish government decided to call-up the navy and coastal fort elements of the Neutrality Guard Force. Kofoed-Hansen received command of all equipped vessels in Danish waters. During the night and next morning most of the ships were prepared, received stores and ammunition and the crews started to arrive. At sunset 1st August, less than 24 hours after the call-up, the enlarged and equipped squadron left the Naval Dockyards, the organisation responsible for all navy logistics and manning.

During the following few days, nearly all navy vessels as well as other attached state ships were prepared, equipped and manned. On that day, 1st August, the admiral fought his first battle with the government over the standing orders. The navy staff had prepared a directive in line with
the instruction of February 1912. The social-liberal Defence (War and Navy) Minister Peter Munch made changes that removed the obligation to counter a sea landing by force. ‘.. in no case will (the navy) initiate attack without the order of the Government unless this takes place in defence ...’ (the ministry had removed the sentence ‘or unless enemy troops disembark in Danish territorial waters at the coast of Zealand.’). During the crisis group meeting the issue led to a direct confrontation with the Foreign Minister Erik Scavenius. After the meeting Kofoed-Hansen wrote to Munch that he would require formal written orders not to meet a landing attempt by force. The admiral was informed by phone that he would not have an answer to his letter. The minority social-liberal Government simply did not have the power to issue formal orders that would undermine the logical basis of the defence system. The orders of the admiral to use force remained in place throughout the war.

The threat perception of Kofoed-Hansen during the crisis was made clear in his Naval Headquarter Order no. 2 of that date: ‘The main mission is to counter a sea landing on Zealand with all available means.’ The mission was explained as follows in the classified official post-war report: ‘It was assumed during this period that a sudden attack from the south was the most likely threat. An attack near Copenhagen (landing at Faxe or in Køge Bay) was considered the most dangerous, as it left the army the least time for concentration. Therefore the main force of the navy was kept concentrated near Copenhagen ready to meet such an attack with all means at a very short warning. The submarines were expected to be a very effective weapon against the enemy transports. ...’ On 1st August the navy ordered the establishment of the planned mine barrier (the ‘A-Barrier’) North of Copenhagen meant to hinder the approach of
an enemy force down the Sound in cooperation with the coastal forts. The mines were laid from 2nd to 6th August.\textsuperscript{52} The freedom of action gained from the admiral’s exchange with the ministers made possible the dispatch of the prepared small force to the Smålandsfarvandet. Besides the two submarines and three torpedo boats, the force included a radio equipped inspection vessel to ensure effective communication with Navy Headquarters.\textsuperscript{53} The force had clear directives: ‘The force detached to the Great Belt will as its special mission ensure timely observation of and reaction to a possible enemy landing on the southern or western coasts of Zealand. In case of the main force of a landing expedition is invading here, parts of the squadron will be sent to the assistance of the detached force ... if possible in a way that ensures that the offensive power of the navy is not weakened by detachments for secondary purposes, but sought maintained, until the time comes, when it ought to be used for its main mission (that of countering the enemy main navy force)’.\textsuperscript{54}
In spite of his regular statements Kofoed-Hansen had not felt certain that he was right. His initial force deployment and orders underlined that he wanted the navy to give the best possible account of itself in the joint defence of Copenhagen. It would be able to contribute even if he had been wrong and the army right in its analysis, and the Germans had made a sudden early attack to force Denmark to act in their interest.

However, even before the widening conflict became an Anglo-German war, Kofoed-Hansen registered positive signals that indicated that he had been right. On the late evening of 2\textsuperscript{nd} August the German ambassador asked Denmark for a clarification of its position, if others brought hostilities to Danish waters. When the crisis group discussed the request on the morning of 3\textsuperscript{rd}, the participants were not aware that the ambassador had acted on his own initiative. This only became clear to the government in the afternoon, after it had responded ‘... that Denmark would in no situation join Germany’s opponents’. Not only did the request in itself indicate that Germany did not feel compelled to move against Denmark, thus confirming Kofoed-Hansen’s analysis. The Danish reply reflected what the admiral felt was the only possible sound option. When King Christian X felt aggrieved, Kofoed-Hansen helped to calm him.\textsuperscript{56}

**Following the German request to Denmark to block the Great Belt**

The events of 5\textsuperscript{th} August have been covered extensively by others.\textsuperscript{57} Large minefields were laid in the Great Belt during the next couple of days. The main fields were ready in armed condition just before noon on 8\textsuperscript{th} August. During the following period they were developed into controlled fields with cables, to be disarmed and armed as required. The two northern main fields would only be disarmed for maintenance or if threatened with serious damage from stormy weather or ice. Smaller minefields laid as controlled on 13\textsuperscript{th}-14\textsuperscript{th} August covered the deep access channels to the ‘Smålandsfarvandet’ around Agersø and Omø. They were placed to protect the rear of the Great Belt squadron in a retreat from the Belt.\textsuperscript{58} During the next couple of years the main Great Belt mine fields were reinforced with additional mines and improved by the replacement by more modern and stable types of mines. Eventually all fields became connected to mine control stations on land. In the autumn of 1916 the rising number of Danish submarines and flying boats made it possible to station a division of each in the Great Belt at Slipshavn near Nyborg on Funen.
The Little Belt was mined in a symbolic way that allowed the German navy free passage. The admiral’s argument was that he could not block the strait completely as Germany controlled one side in the same way as Sweden controlled one side of the Sound. However, this was only correct at the southern end, not at the northern exit. From a strictly neutral and logical point of view, this strait should have been mined against both sides as was the Great Belt. The most likely explanation for the omission is that Kofoed-Hansen deliberately chose to leave the Little Belt open for German use, as a ‘safety valve’, to minimise later pressure to have special passage rights in the Great Belt, when the German navy emerged from its initial feeling of vulnerability and realised its requirements for unhindered access to the Kattegat. An attempted British use of the strait was unlikely because of the German control of the south exit. The King noticed the one-sided character of the barrier and suggested an extension that would close the Little Belt to the Germans. Kofoed-Hansen ignored the suggestion. The German realisation that the Great Belt barrier also reduced German navy freedom of movement came two months later and led to an approach to the Danish Navy Ministry from the Naval Attaché on 27th October 1914, where he proposed that the Danes let withdrawing German units through. The Ministry Director suggested German use of Little Belt or the Sound.

Kofoed-Hansen’s caution proved justified. During the German Navy contingency planning against Denmark that started in autumn 1916, a Danish mining of the Little Belt was defined in mid-November as a ‘casus belli’, triggering an immediate invasion of the country.

A very significant part of the army was mobilised. In Jutland an infantry battalion deployed to Esbjerg. It was reinforced with an artillery detachment of two 75 mm (later older 9 cm) field pieces. The navy prepared for quick mining of the narrow and difficult Grådyb channel to the harbour.

It had been logical for Kofoed-Hansen to drive the decision to mine. With the fields in place his navy would be able to contribute directly to reduce any German compulsion to move into Denmark to cover the open Northern Flank. In his analysis Denmark was already completely dominated by German naval and military power. Mining against all belligerents, but in reality only against the Royal Navy, was the right thing to do, even if the decision conflicted with the ‘open straits’ neutrality concept of December 1912. The benefits for Danish security would probably remain unambiguous until after a decisive German naval defeat in the North Sea. His previous analysis of Germany had been confirmed by events. Many of his own offi-
The Little Belt during the war showing the border between Danish and German territory leaving the deep channels of the southern part of the strait in German hands. The Danish field of 6 mines was laid in the eastern channel between Baagø and Funen. A Danish mining of the western channel later than October 1916 would probably have triggered a German invasion of the country. The sketch was made in June 1918 to report a new German anti-submarine net.63

cers were anglophile and thus blinkered as the majority of the population, the army and the King. All but the rather cynical Foreign Minister had been confused and indecisive. The admiral had used a window of opportunity and guided his unprepared country to act as the situation demanded.

A quite different matter was the Royal Navy’s view of the situation. It was still unclear in the evening of the 5th. Not even the admiral knew
for certain if the British realised that an entry attempt would be suicidal. Laying the Great Belt mine fields could only start on 6\textsuperscript{th} August and would take a couple of days to complete. It meant a period of vulnerability, and at 22.28 on 6\textsuperscript{th} August the lighthouse on the northern Kattegat island of Anholt reported that ‘a large squadron with darkened lanterns passed the island at a distance of eight nautical mines on the way south.’ The navy headquarters immediately asked the Great Belt ‘2\textsuperscript{nd} Squadron’ about the status of the mine laying and thereafter directed the squadron to concentrate on completing the northern fields. After seeking additional information, the headquarters was informed that it had taken the observed force one hour to pass. At 23.49 the headquarters informed 2\textsuperscript{nd} Squadron about the observation in a coded radio message. Two hours later, at 01.33 on 7\textsuperscript{th} August, the lighthouse reported that the message had come from the local army intelligence agent in Anholt harbour. The army had an intelligence network covering the entire country outside Copenhagen Fortress, prepared to report from the occupied land behind enemy lines. The ‘enemy squadron’ had consisted of a fleet of Swedish trawlers.\cite{64} Thereafter Kofoed-Hansen had reserve or retired naval officers sent to key coastal observation and reporting posts like Anholt.

To make effective use of the Great Belt mine barriers they had to be defended. In his directive of 6\textsuperscript{th} August sent by mail to the commander of 2\textsuperscript{nd} Squadron, Captain Garde, his chief of staff until two days earlier, Kofoed-Hansen underlined that the mission was ‘... to block the Great Belt with mines and other combat means to avoid fighting continuing into Danish Waters.’ If foreign warships refused to leave the restricted area, this should be reported to headquarters. ‘A possible attack on the mine barriers from one of the belligerents should be countered by all available means. ... if forced to withdraw from an enemy attack, the squadron should try to retreat to the ‘Smålandsfarvandet’ ‘ where all passage of foreign warships and merchant ships was forbidden.\cite{66} A correction by telegraph made it clear that merchant ships were allowed passage.

However on 7\textsuperscript{th} August, the next day, Kofoed-Hansen found it necessary to clarify the directive by phone. He underlined that the squadron should act impartially, but it should resist an attempt to ‘attack’ the barriers. Contact should be established by sending a negotiator. Request to remove the barriers should be rejected. ‘If an attack is taking place, you are to counter this with all available means.’ If countered by a clearly superior force, the squadron should attempt to withdraw as already outlined.\cite{67}
On 11th August Captain Garde informed the admiral how he saw his mission and the conditions for retreat to Smålandsfarvandet. He divided his analysis into two, before and after a state of war existed between Denmark and the violating state. If no state of war existed, he did not foresee any difficulty in the assembly and retreat of his force. If, on the other hand, the state of war existed, there were difficulties to be expected. If the latter, he was not sure of the degree of difficulty in the assembly and retreat of his force. Since the minelayers ‘Hjælperen’ and ‘Lossen’ had not finished their work at the time the report from Anholt reached Navy HQ, it was uncertain whether they could be ready before or during the state of war. Therefore, it was necessary to consider the situation of both Danish and German forces in the area when deciding on the course of action. If the German forces showed signs of withdrawing, there were reasons to believe that they would leave the area. If, on the other hand, German forces showed signs of continuing their offensive, there were reasons to believe that they would try to advance in the area. Therefore, the admiral could not decide on the course of action without further information. The admiral then asked Captain Garde to provide him with a report on the situation in the area before the state of war existed.
hand, Denmark was at war with the advancing enemy fleet, his reactions would depend on the enemy actions: if the enemy advanced quickly and forcefully with the covering force of cruisers and destroyers, or if he progressed systematically in support of mine clearing operations. In the former situation, the retreat might be complicated.68

Garde still seemed to think within the logical framework of the Wenck prize essay. He did either not understand or accept that the admiral had given him the order to start hostilities in defence of the barrier if necessary.

It seems to have been extremely difficult to realise and accept that one had to open fire in support of neutrality rather than only in defence against an attack or an attempted invasion. In Garde’s instruction of 24th August to the captains of his larger vessels, he would allow the passage of bellige-
rent combatants, if this was not part of ‘an attack’ on the barrier. However, during a visit to the squadron Kofoed-Hansen insisted, and Garde had to send supplementary instructions.  

While Kofoed-Hansen’s willingness to fight against a Royal Navy force baffled his subordinates, the King and other members of the royal family were appalled. On 5th August Christian X had communicated to King George V via the British ambassador that ‘Denmark will ostensible acquiesce in mining the Great Belt, but the mines laid will not be loaded. This is not known to the Danish Government.’ The reply had been: ‘You should convey through Prince George to the King of Denmark the high appreciation of His Majesty for this mark of friendship which will be kept absolutely secret. His Majesty is most deeply sensible of and grateful for the action of the King of Denmark.’ Not only were the mines apparently permanently ‘loaded’, but the Danish navy had been ordered to fight the Royal Navy.

Kofoed-Hansen knew that Prince Valdemar, a naval officer, had expected that the Royal Navy would be allowed through the barriers. The prince had suggested the possibility on 5th August in the presence of the King and Kofoed-Hansen. However, the admiral had pretended not to hear the remark. The King and the two princes were pro-British and apparently could not imagine that the admiral did not share their views. On the other hand it is unlikely that Kofoed-Hansen had foreseen the situation in advance and deliberately decided to let Valdemar mislead the King about his intentions in order to gain the monarch’s support for the decision to mine. Considering the admiral’s later reactions to the King’s disappointment, it is more likely that he simply accepted the advantages of the King’s misunderstanding, believing that Christian X would come around and realise the benefits later.

However, it is certain that the King thought that the admiral had manipulated him, and he later regretted that he ever supported Kofoed-Hansen’s energetic 5th August drive to mine the Great Belt. On 22nd November 1916 the admiral noted that the King had stated that ‘I have until this day not understood why the Hell we had to block the Belt ...’ The King, however, did not passively accept the pro-German neutrality policy of the government and the navy. Throughout the war, he endeavoured to create balance by supplying the British with information about German navy deployments and planning that he received in the regular briefings by the Foreign Minister and the armed services.

The Great Belt barrier would not have covered Denmark or Germany
if Naval Captain A.D. Bubnov had succeeded in convincing his superiors in the Russian High Command with his September 1914 memorandum. He suggested making a limited amphibious landing on the east coast of Jutland to threaten the Kiel Canal. Even if the operation would violate Danish neutrality and was likely to end in failure (which Bubnov realised), it would either draw German troops away from the main Western and Eastern Fronts or force the German High Seas Fleet to deploy from its Baltic Sea sanctuary to the North Sea, where it could be defeated by the Royal Navy. 

On 20th October 1914 Kofoed-Hansen asked for Cabinet support for his wish to conduct a robust defence of the Great Belt barrier. During a late evening government meeting with the Foreign Minister Scavenius absent, the cabinet agreed to allow only a short, symbolic use of force before a retreat. Real combat actions should await a formal government order – not likely ever to be given.

The ministers knew that Captain Garde and the Navy Ministry Director, Captain Jøhnke both disagreed with Kofoed-Hansen’s hard line. The Belt force commander had apparently bypassed his commanding admiral to make his views known in the Ministry. The admiral’s line seemed on the way to become overruled.

However, when the issue was discussed with the admiral the following day, Scavenius was present. The foreign minister supported Kofoed-Hansen, and the compromise text was more or less in line with his intentions. 

2nd Squadron was directed to resist attacks or attempts to force passage through the barrier. If possible, it should seek guidance from naval headquarters. If not possible, the squadron should try to establish contact by negotiator to warn the approaching force that he had been ordered to fight to protect the mine field. Requests to remove the barrier should be denied, and attempts to force a passage - ‘an attack on the barrier’ - should be resisted by all means. If resistance was unsuccessful, the squadron should re-
treat to the Smålandsfarvandet. However, to confuse the issue, the directive repeated the phrase from the general 31st August directive that "... combat should be used only for defence...".80

Kofoed-Hansen had come close to regretting that he had involved the government in the directives to his subordinates, but Scavenius’ support had saved him.

The matter was still not clear to the Great Belt commander. Kofoed-Hansen wrote in his dairy about Garde that "... he feared to end up in a situation where he had to act on his own initiative and risk ('use his conduite')."82

On 16th November, following a visit on the 5th to the Belt Squadron, Kofoed-Hansen sent an additional clarification: ‘Attempts to force access to or passage of the barriers in spite of warning, verbally or by warning shot, is to be considered an attack.’83 Garde was ordered to confirm reception – and understanding - by sending a return message with the same wording.84

The specific question had been settled, but the general problem had still not been solved: How to make small state peace-time naval officers understand and accept that they might have to start hostilities, firing at great power warships. The Captain and his subordinates would be tested – and in Kofoed-Hansen’s opinion fail – when Garde had moved on to the more prestigious position of 1st Squadron commander in the Sound mid-August 1915.

What was required and expected by the admiral became clear in a 2nd Squadron hand-over to new commander on 1st September 1917. The new squadron commander, Captain Henri Konow, did not mind independent responsibility. He had just returned from the post of acting Governor of the Danish Virgin Islands. He had organised the transfer of the islands to the United States earlier that year.

To the Vice-Admiral’s satisfaction, Konow made it clear that he understood that ‘... he, the local commander, had to decide how to act if somebody attempted to force the Great Belt barriers from the north or south.'
There would probably not be time to seek instructions from the navy headquarters, and that headquarters should have freedom to either agree with or disapprove my actions.

Captain Henri Konow, the 2nd Squadron Commander who understood Kofoed-Hansen.

Unexpected and shocking violation: the E.13 affair

Even if the focus had shifted to the important new mission in the Great Belt during the first month of the war, the main joint defence mission remained the protection of Copenhagen. More than half of the navy's combat vessels still had their station and mission in the Sound. On 9th August the laying of the counter-bombardment ‘B-Barrier’ in the northern part of Køge Bay was started, and on 12th August it was ready. It was initially kept disarmed. The arming would be carried out, when required, from small vessels dispatched to buoys connected to the mine cables. Finally in December 1916, the cables were extended and connected to a mine control station on the south coast of Amager.

The command relations in the Sound were complex. A rear-admiral commanded the Copenhagen Seaward Defences. It had three parts, the Copenhagen coastal forts manned by the army, the mine barrier directly linked to the defence of the capital with its mine control station at the Middelgrundfort, and the light torpedo and patrol boats that were considered too obsolete for use by the squadrons. These vessels were under the direct command of the rear-admiral.

In relation to naval operations the rear-admiral was the subordinate of the Commanding Admiral. Otherwise he was a part of the Copenhagen Fortress command structure and thus the subordinate of the supreme commander of the fortress, the Commanding General of the Army. Both
the navy's 1st Squadron and the Submarine Flotilla were based at Copenhagen. Both were directly subordinate to the Commanding Admiral until otherwise decided.

On 5th September 1914 Kofoed-Hansen conducted a conference to create a common operational framework for all these different elements. The submarines would now normally be used against long-range bombardment vessels beyond the minefields in the Sound north of Copenhagen or in Køge Bay. After the clarification on 5th August the anti-invasion mission off Køge apparently seemed less urgent. Most of the operational submarines had already deployed to forward stations on 6th August. Commander Rechnitzer with two submarines operated from Dragør into the Køge Bay and two other boats were stationed in Helsingør. The planned minefield east of Amager would only be laid if necessary.

The co-operation between the coastal forts and 1st Squadron had to be exercised to become efficient, without serious risks of misunderstanding. The large coastal defence ships would supplement the forts; nonetheless remain ready for offensive action if required. The torpedo boats would normally only be used for sorties at night. The submarines should - as a rule - only operate in daylight where they could navigate and find their targets. The old torpedo craft of the Seaward Defences were used in a picket-line at night, moored to telephone buoys placed in a half-circle east of Copenhagen, observing if vessels passed through the fixed beams of the powerful fort searchlights. Their main mission was to register enemy attempts to enter the harbour.

Co-operation between the different units was tested twice early in the war. On 9th September the 1st Squadron and the Submarine Flotilla exercised at the northern Sound exit. On 18th September, a joint navy-coastal fort exercise tested the co-operation between all elements. The scenario was defence against a Royal Navy bombardment force. A squadron of King Edward VII-type battleships, the only Pre-Dreadnoughts still with the Grand Fleet, approached Copenhagen from the north, bombarded the city from a position south of the Swedish island of Hven and thereafter entered into a short-range duel with the forts to destroy them.

The exercises underlined the risks of misunderstanding and friction between the coastal forts and the 1st Squadron vessels. They also highlighted the need to physically separate the use of the submarines from the employment of the surface combatants to avoid ramming and damage to the submarines from own heavy shells.
Deployment of all the submarines from Copenhagen to their patrol positions would take too long. The boats should therefore be used from stations forward of the protective mine barriers. The submarine flotilla was ordered to investigate if the boats could exit the Sound at Kronborg without the
assistance of other ships. If so, the surface vessels and craft would be employed between the coastal forts and the mine barriers. As already mentioned, submarine deployment to Helsingør had taken place on 6th August, and the station became increasingly consolidated. Temporary accommodation was made available, and on 23rd August infantry arrived to guard the submarine station in the ferry harbour. Kofoed-Hansen had pressed the army to second a company. Helsingør would remain the forward base for 2-3 submarines throughout the war.

Dragør on the Amager east coast had initially been marked for the main flotilla effort by the detachment of its commander to that station. However in December 1914 the two boats here were redeployed to Copenhagen Naval Base. The reasons for withdrawing the submarines from Dragør are not entirely clear. One contributing factor was probably the difficult mooring facilities and the logistic problems linked to having 7 submarines stationed at three different locations for an extended period. A second factor was most likely that a clear and restricted deployment pattern also limited the hazard of German patrols in Køge Bay mistaking a Danish submarine for a British. On 27th October the German naval attaché had underlined that risk. He also suggested that the Danish boats got improved nationality markings. That recommendation led to use of larger flags and red-white covers on the periscope masts. However, the real reason is likely to have been Kofoed-Hansen’s conclusion after the events in early August that Germany was no treat as long as Denmark behaved in a prudent way.

Submarines at the Helsingør station. Note the red-white periscope mast covers.
The result was a clear Danish emphasis on meeting Royal Navy operations from the Kattegat. The submarine flotilla immediately started experiments to develop proper tactics. A telephone buoy was placed off Nakkehoved on the north-eastern coast of Zealand for communication with the foremost deployed boat. The buoy was ready on 1st September.\footnote{98}

By coincidence the preparations of the Danish submarine flotilla to counter a British bombardment fleet was observed by a British submarine trying to infiltrate the Sound. The patrol submarine E.11, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Martin Nasmith, was the third boat on the way to the Baltic Sea to achieve what Captain Garde had predicted two years earlier.

As all other navies at the time the Danish Navy and its chief Kofoed-Hansen had focused on the strategic position and role the country might have in a future surface naval war. Nobody had foreseen that the Danish Straits, the Kattegat and the territorial water along the Jutland North Sea coast would become key transit routes in the intensifying submarine war.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{images.jpg}
\caption{Lt. Cdrs. Baron Caj Schaffalitzky de Muckadell (‘Havmanden’)$^{99}$ & Martin Nasmith (E.11)$^{100}$}
\end{figure}
that culminated in the close to successful attempt to suffocate England by unlimited submarine warfare in 1917. All major violations of Danish neutrality from October 1914 onwards would be caused by submarine operations. Even if the late February 1918 Igotz Mendis incident was linked to surface trade warfare, the main Danish worry during the event was the presence of two German submarines.

On 19th October 1914 Nasmith in E.11 identified a foreign submarine off Nakkehoved on the Zealand north-east coast as U-3. Frustrated by delays due to engine problems and German patrols the British submarine commander fired two torpedoes. One ‘fish’ malfunctioned and surfaced. The other ran deep, just touching the target submarine’s keel, and proceeded to explode against boulders at the beach. The Danish submarine ‘Havmanden’ commanded by the Cai Schaffalitzky de Muckadell - a future celebrated author of boys’ books - had a lucky day.

The Danish boat had been saved by its small size and by Royal Navy technicians forgetting to compensate for the torpedo warhead being 40 pounds heavier than the exercise head. Nasmith moved to fame next year with E.11 in the Sea of Marmara.101

‘Havmanden’ had been the point boat in the new Submarine Flotilla war plan. The seven operational boats would be deployed as a string of pearls as shown earlier in the September exercise chart with the southern boat just north of the ‘A-Barrier’, one halfway to Helsingør, one off Helsingør, and three between Helsingør and Nakkehoved. When in position, they would be alerted by radio, telephone to the point boat or messages carried by motor boats from the coast or by flying boats.102 The flying boat unit was being developed under the technical elite umbrella of the Submarine Flotilla.

During 1915 the two E.-class boats in the Baltic Sea proved their value to both their Russian hosts and to their enemy by attacking German warships as well as the iron ore traffic along the Swedish coast. It therefore got the attention of the German Navy when Dutch newspapers mid-August published information that Russia asked for three more British submarines. Soon the Germans received reports about submarine sightings from the Kattegat.

Late evening of 18th August 1915 E.13 ran aground in Danish waters just off the south-eastern corner of the flat and muddy island of Saltholm. The German anti-submarine patrol in the Sound had been alerted chasing the sister boat E.8 that passed through the same night.103 After being
observed by a Danish torpedo boat sounding the depth just east of the stranded submarine in the early morning of 19th August - as a possible preparation for later return - German torpedo boats left E.13 and Danish territory. However, some hours later, two large German torpedo boats suddenly re-entered Danish territory at high speed ignoring the presence of Danish vessels and destroyed the English boat by gunfire, after one of their torpedoes had exploded against the bottom.

The destroyed E.13.¹⁰⁴

The attack was linked to events elsewhere in the Baltic Sea. At 7.20 on the same morning the British submarine E.1 - that entered the Baltic through the Sound ahead of E.11 in October 1914 - had torpedoed and damaged the German battle cruiser Moltke at the Riga Gulf entrance. The two German torpedo boats that suddenly violated Danish neutrality had been ordered by the Baltic Fleet HQ to destroy the E.13 to ensure that it would not be able to enter the Baltic and join the fray off the Baltic coast.¹⁰⁵

Half the British submarine crew drowned trying to escape by swimming to the island. The Danish Navy was shocked by the ugly reality of war and
by the fact that it had failed in foresight and its obligations as a neutrality guard. The immediate action was a combination of cover-up and creative tailoring of the official story to avoid international criticism - the drafting closely guided by the Foreign and Defence Ministers. It was helped by the fact that the escaping British crew-members had their view of events blocked by their submarine’s hull. It made it impossible for them to see the German and Danish vessels after they abandoned ship.

Thereafter Kofoed-Hansen issued tough instructions to prevent a repetition. The wrath of the admiral hit those directly responsible, his anger probably nourished by the fact that just prior to its destruction he had informed the King that the submarine was under his navy’s effective protection. The powerful 1st Squadron was on the way to take responsibility for the mission. The Navy Commander was proving to his monarch that he was willing to use force against Germans if necessary – and then his subordinates failed in their obvious duty.

During the morning of 19th August the events were influenced by vague perceptions of what might happen, by unclear command relations, by communication problems between the 1st Squadron vessels carrying radios and the old torpedo boats of the Copenhagen Seaward Defences that had to communicate visually or via the telephone buoy of the command vessel, by a rather widespread lack of urgency, by a basic unwillingness to get...
involved in somebody else’s war, as well as by lack of will to take risks by firing at the violating great power vessel.

During that morning Kofoed-Hansen was unique in his understanding that the navy had to take risks to ensure that Danish neutrality would be respected by the belligerents.  

The pre-Dreadnought coastal defence ship ‘Peder Skram’, the 1st Squadron flag ship on 19th August 1915. Being within effective artillery range of the German torpedo boats during their attack on E.13, Captain Garde decided not to intervene because of the risks to his ship and of escalation to a German-Danish war. Kofoed-Hansen was unimpressed. 

Even if other possible minor violations had been covered by different instructions, the focus had been on the use of Danish territory in relation to major German or British operations in the Kattegat and the Great Belt or against the Jutland peninsular – in what could be characterized as operational level violations. Tactical violations resulting from deliberate acts of war against the opponent in Danish waters had not received much attention, even if British submarine operations in the Baltic had been fore-
seen before the war and had now been a reality for more than a year. It had also been acknowledged that the forces in the Saltholm fortifications were incapable of observing the Danish part of Flinterenden, the channel between Saltholm and Sweden.

On the day of E.13’s navigational problem, the 18th August, the Navy Headquarters had received a memo describing a practical solution to the organisation of an observation post on the east coast of Saltholm. After the E.13 incident, the issue received immediate attention. If the later observation post at the south-eastern corner of Saltholm had been in place in the night of 18th-19th August, the misfortune of E.13 might have been registered earlier in spite of the mist. However, the outcome is unlikely to have been much different, as the failure was both human and systemic.

On 25th August Kofoed-Hansen issued a directive meant to prevent similar failures in the future. It divided violations in two groups: ‘insignificant’ and ‘significant’. The ‘significant’ ones included four types: firstly attacks on Danish vessels or invasion of Danish territory, secondly attacks on belligerent vessels under the protection of the Danish Flag, thirdly attempts to pass through waters barred to belligerent warships and finally combat between the belligerents continuing into Danish waters. The directive covered the full spectrum of possible violations. In situations of the second category, Danish vessels should be placed to physically cover the protected vessel, no matter what risk of damage. If an attack proceeded in spite of a protest, the Danish units should use their weapons to defend the protected vessel. Protests could take the form of international signal, a verbal protest, a written protest, by firing blanks and by firing live warning shots across the bows. The form of protest would depend on the situation. However, it is doubtful that even if that directive had been in place one week earlier it would have prevented the attack on E.13. The German torpedo boat commander was under orders to destroy the British boat. Rear-admiral Mischke, who gave the order, was convinced that ‘the military point of view made immediate action his duty’. A small Danish torpedo boat moored alongside the larger vessel would not have prevented its destruction. It would have required the presence of the full 1st Squadron to give the German a valid excuse for not following orders.

During the war the standing orders became ever more refined. In order to react quickly and accurately, the relevant signals were to be prepared so that they could be raised without delay. One cannon should be kept loaded with blank and another with live ammunition. On 1st January 1917 the
rules were tightened for reaction against belligerent warships inspecting or arresting foreign ships in Danish territorial waters. If the violation was not stopped by a protest and warning, force should be used. The standing orders and directives stayed in place until 19th August 1918, exactly three years after the E.13 incident, and four months after Kofoed-Hansen’s death in April of that year.

Anton Ferdinand Mazanti Evers, his successor as Vice-Admiral, had been involved in the 19th August 1915 events as commander of Copenhagen Seaward Defences. Evers had not been criticised for his actions. However, he was now replaced by Garde, who had been in direct command when the German torpedo boats attacked E.13 within the easy range of his flag-ship’s heavy guns.

Evers was probably promoted to Commanding Admiral because he accepted the Navy Ministry Director, Captain Jøhnke’s, leading role in all important matters. The relations between Kofoed-Hansen and the Director had sometimes been very difficult.

Nevertheless, in spite of the dispute about the standing orders during the first period of the war and the recriminations after the E.13-incident, the only change in the new directive was a clearer emphasis on the use of protest before using weapons for effect.

A less independent minded subordinate than Kofoed-Hansen. His successor Vice-Admiral Anton Ferdinand Mazanti Evers.

Permanent German response to submarine incursions
The new attempt to send British submarines into the Baltic Sea led to a forceful German reaction that seriously limited the Danish navy’s freedom of action. One month after the E.13-incident, on 18th September 1915, Germany informed Denmark that she would block the Sound south of Saltholm and Amager into the Køge Bay with a mine barrier and anti-submarine nets. The mining started on the 24th and was completed in a few days.
To support and maintain the minefield, the German navy thereafter placed a significant naval force south of the barrier. During the early days of February 1916 German aircraft twice violated the barred airspace over Copenhagen Fortress. The reaction of the navy to the new situation was to consider laying its own planned minefield off Dragør on the Amager east coast. It would close the channel between Amager and Saltholm to both British submarines and German warships. A German request for an extension of its Drogden field into Danish territorial water was rejected.

The possibility of reacting with a Danish barrier was examined and the detailed planning done from 11th February. On 16th February the decision was taken, and the new field - the ‘D-Barrier’ - was ready on the 19th. The barrier would normally be kept armed, and the mines in the open channel in the field would be armed on the approach of any belligerent surface combatants or submarine. From 27th April onwards the navy also kept the anti-bombardment ‘B-barrier’ in Køge Bay armed. Arming the ‘B-barrier’ was directed against Germany. The E.13 affair and the German mining and the accompanying permanent deployment to the Køge Bay seem to have made Kofoed-Hansen realise for the first time since the start of the war that Germany remained a threat to Danish neutrality.

The combination of the German mine barrier in the Sound and the

![The D-barrier between Amager and Saltholm established February 1916.](image)
German force south of that barrier meant that the Danish army realised in the summer of 1916 that the navy's ability to meet a German landing in the Køge Bay with a sortie from Copenhagen had disappeared. The left flank of the new forward ‘Tune position’ being constructed in front of Copenhagen Fortress during these months was exposed to the risk of a surprise sea landing as was the south coast of Amager.\textsuperscript{126}

Kofoed-Hansen acknowledged the new situation in June 1916: ‘The German barriers south of the Sound and the Belt closes the Baltic Sea to our submarines, our only effective means against a German landing. Germany, which undoubtedly has a couple of hundred thousand men in the Duchies, can therefore land troops on Zealand as easily as on Funen.’\textsuperscript{127}

The admiral had already taken steps to meet the new threat. With the number of Danish submarines increased by the commissioning of the ‘B-class’ boats, it became possible to detach a division of 2-3 submarines to the Great Belt, from where they could reach the Sound through the just deepened ‘Tolke’-channel in Grønsund between the islands of Falster and Møn. After considering and rejecting Masnedø as the new submarine station, Slipshavn on the east coast of Funen was selected as the Great Belt submarine and naval air station. Submarines had already been training with 2\textsuperscript{nd} Squadron in the belt in June 1916, and in early August they started operations from new station,\textsuperscript{128} with the main part of the later training activities in the Smålandsfarvandet.

The admiral outlined the situation that would result from British naval operations in the Skagerrak and Kattegat: ‘... the note to the Danish government will only be handed over, when the (British) fleet passes the Skaw, and is likely to have the character of an ultimatum. At the same time Germany will put its second inquiry in the war about our intentions, however this time the Danish government will not get 6 or 3 hours’ notice. An immediate answer will be expected, and only one answer will satisfy: “All Danish forces turned against England at the first violation.” Any turning away from the consequences of the decision to block the Belt will lead to an immediate invasion over the border and landing of German forces on Zealand, Funen and Langeland ... If we answer, as Germany has the right to expect, ... it will be possible ... to prevent that German troops enter the country against our will, at least not before English forces have violated our territory. Immediately following the answer, mobilisation must follow, one of the three divisions in Zealand must be transferred to Funen and Langeland, and a state of siege declared in Copenhagen. ...’\textsuperscript{129}
Comparing Kofoed-Hansen’s prediction with the German planning that started two months later, he was too optimistic with regard to keeping German troops from crossing the border. He was more correct in relation to the character of the ultimatum and would probably have approved that the Danish response became discussed in advance.

German Planning against Denmark and the Kattegat ‘Sweep’
The Danish authorities were aware that the situation was far from safe. Even if they could not know that the Kaiser had authorised the contingency operations plan against Denmark - the ‘Fall J’ - on 2nd December 1916\textsuperscript{130}, they knew that German perceptions of British actions could trigger an attack. The situation was tense after the declaration of the unlimited U-boat war starting 1\textsuperscript{st} February 1917.

The army commander, General Gørtz, feared in early February that a British response limited to a larger British incursion into the Kattegat could ‘lead to serious complications for us’\textsuperscript{131}. Kofoed-Hansen thought that British attempts to keep the U-boats from leaving their British Channel and North Sea bases might encourage the German Navy to send the boats via the Sound and Little Belt. If that happened, the Royal Navy could attempt to meet them in the Kattegat, if not with battle squadrons, then with cruisers, destroyers and submarines.\textsuperscript{132} The admiral’s view was later used by the army to counter political pressure to reduce its neutrality guard.\textsuperscript{133}

In German strategic perception Jutland, South Norway, Kattegat and Skagerrak were considered to be directly linked. Therefore, one of the factors that would make ‘Fall J’ necessary was the operations against Norway – planned as ‘Fall N’ – that should counter British use of Kristiansand or other South Norwegian ports as naval bases.

Late May 1917 the German military leadership suspected that Norway was negotiating with Britain about joining the Entente. The October 1916 ban on belligerent submarine use of Norwegian territorial waters had been regarded as an unfriendly act directed against Germany. During the winter months of 1917, different ‘Fall N’-versions had been considered, and on 21\textsuperscript{st} April the German Naval Staff issued its directive for the operation. It came more that 6 months later than the ‘Fall J’ directive - it had been ready 16\textsuperscript{th} October 1916.

The Norwegians had in fact had discrete discussions with Britain about assistance in case of a German attack. However, the occasion that led
to the May 1917 German concern may have been a debate in the American London colony around 20th May. Ludendorff believed that the rumour might be true, even if Scavenius tried to convince Berlin via the German ambassador that it was without basis. The Naval Staff ordered increased patrolling in the Skagerrak with U-boats and air craft to gain the early warning necessary for a timely execution of Fall J and Fall N. Fortunately nothing happened during the next weeks.

However, some months later, the foreseen situation seemed to become reality. On the early morning of 2nd November 1917 an incursion force of British light cruisers and destroyers including the new light cruiser HMS 'Ceres' entered the Kattegat. At 08.30 south of Anholt they found and sank the German auxiliary ship 'Kronprinz' and some trawlers. 'Kronprinz' was on the way back from her normal mission guarding the German fishing fleet against British submarines. At 10.30 the British force was reported heading north, out of Kattegat.
Probably on the same day’s afternoon an exited officer from the German Naval Attaché’s office asked for a meeting in the Danish Naval Ministry. German authorities had been alerted by the heavy Danish radio traffic provoked by the sweep. The Naval Command in Kiel had received intelligence from the Swedish Naval port of Gothenburg that a large British squadron operated in the Kattegat. The officer asked for information if the Danish Great Belt Squadron would resist an attempt to pass through the mine barriers. The Danish ministry official called the responsible Swedish naval authority and succeeded to establish contact in a couple of minutes. The Swedes made clear that the German intelligence of a large British naval force off Gothenburg was without foundation. The ministry noted that the Germans apparently accepted the effectiveness and importance of the Great Belt Barrier.

Thereafter the German navy for a time cancelled all U-boat transit via the Kattegat, as it feared that the British force had laid a new mine field.

The Royal Navy ‘sweep’ exposed both the weakness of German naval intelligence in Danish waters as well as the inherent friction between the German Navy and the German Foreign Ministry. Who was responsible for reporting to whom? The German ambassador to Copenhagen made clear that he was in no way willing to offer the Navy an excuse for launching the operation against Denmark.

On 1st December the German Naval Attaché followed-up the incident in a meeting with the Naval Ministry Director, Captain Jøhnke. The affair had created much anxiety in the German Admiralty. It had proven that the German intelligence was inefficient. The light forces might have been the advanced elements of a battle squadron on the way to bombard Kiel. The German High Seas Fleet would need 24 hours to pass through the Kiel Canal to meet a British force. Could Germany establish an advanced observation post in Jutland? ... or would it be possible to send information about Danish observations by radio ‘in clear’ to the Great Belt Squadron?

Jøhnke had to deny Germany either service. However, the ministry was prepared to investigate and clarify information if asked by the Embassy. A calming message would be in the interest of all.

Indeed.

Powerless in the North Sea: the Bjerregaard incident
The British attempts to stop the U-boats on the way to or from their patrol areas did not force the Germans away from the North Sea and British
Channel into using the Sound and Little Belt as their main transit routes. One of the safer routes in the North Sea was along the Jutland West Coast - the ‘Weg weiss’ - using Danish territorial water for partial protection. The Royal Navy had laid a large anti-submarine minefield on 13th August 1917 to block that route,\textsuperscript{144} and during the next couple of months it conducted anti U-boat operations with large forces. The British mine fields were now so far north of the barriers protecting the German North Sea bases that the escorts became ever more vulnerable to Royal Navy search operations.

The summer 1917 was a period of transition in Royal Navy anti U-boat operations from the relatively ineffective combination of attempts to hunt and ambush the boats at their prepared and mine-cleared routes through the British barriers and the use of armed decoys - 'Q-ships' - to convoy protection of merchant shipping.\textsuperscript{145}

At first light on 1\textsuperscript{st} September 1917 the British conducted a large sweep towards the Jutland coast. Two escorted U-boats were intercepted by a force of three battle cruisers, four light cruisers and eight destroyers off Bjerregaard. The U-boats dived and later escaped. The British ships concentrated their fire on the four mine-sweeping armed trawlers.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image.png}
\caption{One of the beached German armed trawlers at Bjerregaard, probably the ‘Rinteln’.\textsuperscript{146}}
\end{figure}

In order to save the crews, the four vessels steamed for the coast and beached in a hail of shells about 100 meters from the coast. The British destroyers approached to less than 1 nautical mile from the coast and destroyed the four trawlers. The Danish observers reported constant signalling between the destroyers and the larger ships. The shelling straddled the fields and dunes around the farms.
One German crew member drowned on the way ashore, the rest were saved and thereafter put under the guard of infantry detached in the afternoon from the battalion in Esbjerg - later to be interned. Due to luck and the character of the Bjerregaard terrain no Danes were killed or wounded. The end of the incident was observed by a German airplane, and late morning five large German torpedo boats arrived on the scene. A boat with an officer and nine or ten ratings was sent to contact and pick-up the trawler crews – only to be interned as well.

The Danish Navy neutrality guard on the North Sea coast, the inspection ship ‘Absalon’.  

The inspection ship ‘Absalon’ was the only Danish naval vessel in the neighbourhood. Stationed at Esbjerg, she only arrived on the scene about 8 hours after the event and a couple of hours later than the German torpedo boats’ visit. The British violation of Danish neutrality had been as serious as the German action off Saltholm two years earlier. In this case the only possible Danish reaction was a protest after the event.  

The British response note from 22nd September denied having entered Danish territorial water during the incident, but accepted that the shelling had been a violation. The note added: ‘I trust that I shall not be misunderstood if I venture to add that His Majesty’s Government find it increasingly difficult to admit that German warships are entitled to be treated as
inviolable within Danish territorial waters while German submarines pass without hindrance through those waters in order to carry out their illegal campaign against both belligerent and neutral merchant vessels, including those which fly the Danish flag. ...."149

The Germans in the Baltic would probably have agreed with most of the text even if the British submarines there operated according to international law.

German crew members posing for the photographer with elements of the Esbjerg Detachment.150

North Sea weather in support of the police and mature procedures: the 'Igotz Mendis' affair end February 1918

In the evening of 24th February 1918 the Højen Lighthouse on the western coast of the Skaw reported that an unknown steamer had stranded close to the lighthouse. It became clear later that the lack of detailed charts had led the captain to mistake Højen for Skagen lighthouse in the foggy weather.

'Diana', the navy guard ship at Skagen was immediately sent to investigate. According to the stranded steamer's mate, it was the German merchant ship 'Igotz Mendis' en route from Bergen to Kiel. When Navy Headquarters realised that the ship was registered in Bilbao by Lloyds, it became evident that the stranding could develop into a difficult incident.

The Diana was ordered to counter - if necessary by force - any British attempts of inspection or arrest. The torpedo boat ‘Spækhuggeren’ was dispatched from the Sound by 1st Squadron.
In the evening it was established that the ship had a German naval deck crew whereas the engine crew was Spanish. It was flying the German Naval Flag. Navy Headquarters decided to treat the ship as a German auxiliary cruiser and ordered 2nd Squadron in the Great Belt to dispatch the small cruiser ‘Heimdal’ to the Skaw. The navy did not want to be caught again with insufficient force present. The ships were to operate directly under Navy Headquarters from arrival.

During the night ‘Diana’ reported that ‘Igotz Mendis’ was an unarmed Spanish ship with an original crew of 32. It had been taken as German prize by the successful auxiliary cruiser ‘Wolf’ with a cargo of coal on 17th November 1917 in the Indian Ocean. The prize crew consisted of around 20 naval personnel.
‘Wolf’ got through to Kiel for massive celebrations and rewards.¹⁵⁵

The ship still carried the passengers from the different ‘Wolf’ victims: British, Japanese, Chinese, Americans and one Dane. The commander of the prize crew, a naval reserve lieutenant, protested in advance against a possible internment. He had not planned the stranding.
The next morning the lieutenant asked the Danes to bring the passengers ashore, and all were safely landed within a couple of hours. Both the Spanish crew and the German prize crew still wanted to stay onboard. The weather was fair. The passenger group was even more diverse than previously thought. It included women and two children. Some passengers reported that the ship had been taken prize east of Mauritius on the way to Colombo.

The torpedo boat ‘Spækhuggeren’ arrived at the scene on the 25th at 10.45 and ‘Heimdal’ followed three hours later.

The German lieutenant became increasingly exited and difficult. The Danish authorities had denied him the assistance offered by the Switzer company tug ‘Viking’ to get off the sandbank. They also refused him direct contact to his ambassador. He had been grateful initially when the ‘Diana’ with her crew on action stations had been prepared to protect his prize against the British. Now he probably found it difficult to accept that the Danes would not help him and his crew to get on the way to join the celebration of their ‘Wolf’ crew mates started on their arrival in Kiel 19th February.

During the 26th February the weather got worse. The Spanish crew was now willing to leave ship, but the prize crew stayed.

In the evening the Danish government decided that ‘Igotz Mendis’ should be handed over to the Spanish captain. The German prize crew should leave the ship and would be interned. The local chief of police would be responsible for convincing the Germans to leave and ensure that they did not damage the ship before leaving. The social-liberal government did not trust the armed forces enough to let them handle incidents that might escalate to a direct confrontation with a belligerent. Jurisdiction on Danish territory was therefore defined as a police matter.

The navy would only be responsible for countering foreign naval interference. It proved necessary. In the morning a German U-boat drew near ‘Igotz Mendis’ and tried to contact her by radio. ‘Heimdal’ blocked the attempt by jamming the transmission with its own more powerful transmitter. In the evening three German torpedo boats were reported steaming north through the Little Belt at high speed. The situation could become difficult.

At noon the next day, the 27th February, the ‘Heimdal’ had to fire three warning shots to stop another larger U-boat from communicating with the prize crew. However, at this time the North Sea had given direct support
to the police chief to solve his problem of getting the Germans off the ship without anybody hurt and without the ship being blown-up. In the early morning the German lieutenant sent a distress signal and asked to be rescued. When the large U-boat arrived, the ship was under Spanish flag and the requested rescue of the German prize crew underway. During the night the worsening weather had convinced the officer that internment was safer than staying onboard.

A guard crew from ‘Heimdal’ was sent onboard ‘Igotz Mendis’. Even if the situation now seemed to improve, Navy Headquarters decided to reinforce the presence at the Skaw and dispatched the small new torpedo boat ‘Springeren’ from the Copenhagen Seaward Defences on the morning of the 28th.

After the Spanish ship had been towed off the sand on 10th March by ‘Viking’, she was escorted to Frederikshavn by ‘Heimdal’ and the two torpedo boats. ‘Igotz Mendis’ needed repairs before a later return to Spain.\footnote{157}

The navy spent the rest of the war in a demanding routine that exhausted both equipment and crews, with training increasingly hampered by the scarcity of fuel.

The weak and partly obsolete forces had, however, the advantage of still being guided by a strong will in support of a pragmatic view of strategic reality. Kofoed-Hansen’s legacy dominated his service even after the admiral’s death 7 months before the end of the war, one month after the successful conclusion of the ‘Igotz Mendis’ incident.
Minor mutiny, decay of safety procedures, and a German mine in Danish territorial water: the awkward ‘Sværdfisken’ disaster

Fighting ended on 10th November, but not the main war-time task of the Danish Navy. Before the work had ended, nearly six thousand mines from the belligerents had been disarmed or destroyed, about 90 percent on Danish beaches. Nearly five hundred had been found drifting - a major threat to shipping. Only 8 foreign mines were still anchored when taken care of.

Not all mines were found in time. Ship with serious mine damage at Burmeister & Wain Shipyard.\textsuperscript{158}

The clearing of the Danish mine fields started on 13th November, and five days later Naval Headquarters prepared the operation to clear the German mine field laid on 5th August 1914 and supplemented later in the Langelandsbelt - the southern part of the Great Belt. The headquarters underlined that the information about the position of the field was highly uncertain, as it was only based on observations from land and informal conversations with German naval personnel.

The mine sweeping would be highly risky for the involved crews and equipment. Some mines were only 1-1½ meters from the surface. Only
Danish territorial water should be cleared. A plan for the operation was ready on 19\textsuperscript{th} November. The clearing should be conducted in three phases.

Initially mines close to the surface should be found by pairs of rowing boats or motor boats drawing a line between them, thereafter cutting the anchor chain and destroying the mine on the surface.

The next phase should be use of torpedo boats in formation with standard paravan mine clearing gear.

The final phase would be use of a ‘Swedish mine sweep’ to clear to a depth of 15 meters.

Six torpedo boats, specialist vessels, some motor boats and the rescue boats from the ships would be needed. Progress should be marked by buoys. The operations should be controlled by the small coastal defence ship ‘Skjold’.

The character and risk of the planned mine clearing mission led to a discipline crisis in the Great Belt squadron in late November. The crews were reported to refuse carrying out the mine clearing even when offered a significant cash bonus. They had sent an inquiry to Copenhagen to clarify if it would be considered mutiny to refuse participating in the dangerous mine clearing operation.

The situation was tense and the discipline brittle everywhere by the end of November as a result of the trouble in Germany that had inspired Left-Socialists all over Europe. The trouble in the Danish Navy was not limited to the Great Belt. The 1\textsuperscript{st} Squadron torpedo boats at Copenhagen also protested against their use as mine sweepers in clearing German fields.

\textit{Second phase mine sweeping, the job of the ‘Delfinen’-division.}
The situation was quickly and successfully managed with a combination of luck, carrot and whip.

Even before the report about the discipline problem was ready, the situation had improved. On 26th November 2nd Squadron had made contact with a force of nine modern German mine sweepers. They had been ordered by the Royal Navy to clear German mines from the main Langelands-belt channel. The German flotilla commander handed over a sketch of the mine lines, making the Danish mine clearing dramatically less risky.

On the 27th November the mine sweeping started, line by line, from the north towards south on the western (Langeland) side of the channel cleared by the Germans.¹⁶¹

All crew members involved in mine clearing were later given a cash bonus, and on 5th December it was made clear that only a refusal to sail when formally ordered to do so would be considered to be mutiny.¹⁶²

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¹⁶¹ The estimated position of the mine fields and the German sketch.¹⁶³
During the following days the mine clearing in Danish territorial waters proceeded as planned, the work and management becoming an uneventful routine. Wrecks were found, but no mines. The low quality mines from the northern original 5th August 1914 mine line had disappeared. At the end of each day a debriefing took place onboard the ‘Skjold’, followed by orders for the next day’s work. On 4th-5th December, work had ended on the western side and thereafter continued on the Lolland side of the Belt.

One week later foggy weather conditions made control and navigation difficult (it depended on visible land marks and buoys) and thus mine work much more dangerous. The weather contributed to the disaster that struck on the morning of 14th December. It was a typical case of dangerous work that seemed less risky after an uneventful period. It led to sloppy procedures as well as weak command and control.

Tasking for the next day’s (14th December) phase two and three work did not await the final reports from the late afternoon phase one effort. Only after ‘Hvalrossen’ and ‘Sværdfisken’ had received their orders for the next day and had left, the commander of the ‘Delfinen’ division was informed that the phase one search had identified a possible mine. The initial work area of the division for the next morning would therefore be changed. Neither the division commander nor the mission responsible ‘Skjold’ captain made certain that the changed orders reached the other division boats before morning.
‘Sværdfisken’ had been given an additional small task and therefore sailed early. When she proceeded to the originally designated phase two work area she hit a mine astern. 8 crew members died, and 3 were wounded. The explosion had folded the stern upwards, and supported between the two sister boats she reached Korsør.

On 21st December Navy Headquarters proposed that the worst accident of the navy neutrality guard should be considered purely accidental. Nobody should be considered responsible. The explosion of the anchored German mine had occurred far into Danish territorial water. This fact would become public if anybody was blamed. It could not be considered desirable from a foreign policy point of view. On the 13th January 1919 the Navy Ministry concurred that nobody should be blamed.165

The two directly involved naval officers felt the effect anyway, as had been the case with the torpedo boat flotilla commander involved in the E.13 incident. The career prospects were no longer promising. ‘Sværdfisken’s young commander left the navy five years later, but looking at the photo of the deck, the loss of a possible career was probably a secondary worry.166

*The stern part of the ‘Sværdfisken’ deck on arrival in Korsør.*167
The army in positional defence against the developing domestic reality

Compared to the navy, the army was handicapped by no longer being led by the officer who had defined, thereafter defended and further developed his views about the strategic framework and the derived missions for the Danish armed forces. The army’s ‘prophet’ was no longer around to learn and adjust. Kofoed-Hansen’s main competitor in the 1902 Defence Commission had been Arnold Kühnell, initially the General Staff Operations Department Chief, shortly thereafter Chief of the General Staff and finally the Commanding General for the Zealand District and designated army commander. If he had not died in early June 1908, he would have commanded the army at least until mid-1915, his normal retirement date.

Kühnell had inspired the thinking that ruled the army throughout the following decade. During his six years as head of the Operations Department from May 1897 the dynamic infantry officer had led and modernised the Danish General Staff Officer Course, created a comprehensive set of field manuals for tactics, staff work, administration and logistics and reformed command and control procedures. At the start of the new century he developed a common understanding among the service elite of the army’s political possibilities after the fall of Prime Minister Estrup. To what
extend he was inspired or only confirmed in his views by his visit to the Dutch division exercises in September 1900 is not clear. The exercises took place in southern Overijssel and northern Gelderland in a classical German attack scenario.\textsuperscript{169} However, his concept for the relationship between the forward neutrality defence of Zealand and a final resistance at Fortress Copenhagen against the worst case scenario – a German attack – is similar in character to the Dutch Army defence concept described by Willem Klinkert: an initial deployment to the directly threatened southern part of the country to be followed by a withdrawal to Fortress Holland.\textsuperscript{170} After Kühnell’s death this understanding stagnated into the dogma that guided and limited the thinking of the army up to the end of the war.

**From Kühnell’s solution to simplified dogma**

There was no successor of Kühnell’s standing to replace him. In August 1909, 14 months after his death, the liberal government chose to promote the two years younger Jens Vilhelm Gørtz in his place. Gørtz was a deliberate, wise, inarticulate, gentlemanly, decent and stubborn bureaucrat. He had been picked by Kühnell to replace him as Chief of the General Staff in 1905\textsuperscript{172}, and he would probably have been adequate in that position, serving the forceful and respected commander. Gørtz served and implemented what he saw as Kühnell’s legacy\textsuperscript{173}, from February 1912 supported by Major-General Palle Berthelsen as his Chief of General Staff. Berthelsen was a hard-working, dynamic officer, with a successful career both as staff officer and commander. He kept close links to the conservative political supporters of the army. In his capacity as Chief of the Operations Department of the General Staff, he had been the closest assistant of Kühnell during the decisive phases of the Defence Commission work. Like Gørtz, Berthelsen could only serve what he saw as the master’s teaching.

Kühnell had been convinced that there would be an urgent competition to gain control of Denmark at the outbreak of a war between Germany and England. Germany would probably use its proximity to get there first. The Germans were likely to act very early, possibly prior to formal hostilities, make a coup landing in or close to Copenhagen and threaten bombardment of the capital to force the Danish government to let her use Danish territory to control the Straits. The coup landing and bombardment experience of 1807, with its demonstration of the feebleness of political will under direct pressure, was still very much remembered.
The bureaucratic custodian minded gentleman and the dynamic guardian of the Kühnell legacy: Lieutenant-General Vilhelm Gørtz and Major-General Palle Berthelsen.\textsuperscript{174}

The German action would be unacceptable to England, and she would have to send a force to Denmark’s assistance quickly. If the Danish defence forces survived the German coup invasion, parried the threat of bombardment and concentrated as much as possible of the mobilised army from all parts of the country in the Copenhagen Fortress, they could last long enough for the British to arrive in force to assist. The April 1911 General Staff Exercise had assumed that six infantry and one cavalry divisions – the entire British Expeditionary Force – would be sent to Zealand.\textsuperscript{175} If the Danish army was successfully mobilised before an invasion, the Zealand field army would remain deployed for coastal defence, leaving the reserve infantry units to guard the Fortress. Kühnell had calculated that an effective coastal defence of the main island would require 28 regular - ‘line’ - infantry battalions.\textsuperscript{176}

The Fortress would be stocked with supplies to last a siege of two months. If no assistance came, Denmark had at least given an honourable demonstration of its will to exist. The dogma ridiculed the idea of any major German army operations against Jutland: The Germans were professio-
nals. They knew that the strategic centre of gravity was the Danish capital and would not waste resources on secondary objectives. They would get all relevant advantages, including control of the deepest - the eastern - channel through the Great Belt by taking Zealand and forcing the Danish government in Copenhagen to capitulate to their demands. All use of regular field army forces outside Zealand was therefore seen as unprofessional waste. Such forces would probably be unable to reach Copenhagen after the start of hostilities due to the German control of Danish waters. 1864 had clearly demonstrated that Jutland could not be defended with the forces available. Ideally forces outside Zealand should only be capable of marking sovereignty and thereafter quickly retreat to a place - a ‘reduit’ - suitable for an extended and thus honourable final defence. 177

The only senior officer not controlled by the ‘group-think’ was August Tuxen, the Commanding General for Jutland and Funen. He had not been trained as a General Staff Officer. He was a military historian, who had researched and written the still best military history of the Great Nordic War. He was a smug intellectual with a large international network of contacts. Tuxen was probably unique as a military historian of the time by being honoured by the historical enemy. He had been given an honorary doctorate by a Swedish university. His historical work had limited his practical professional service, but he tried to compensate by using and misusing his intellectual brilliance and supreme analytical powers. This occasionally led him to challenge the Kühnoll Dogma. However being a sceptic and cynic he never stood his ground when the senior disciples of reacted against the heresy. 178

Lieutenant-General August Tuxen: a forceful independent thinker and cynical and pragmatic observer of human idealism and folly. 179
After the experience of 1864 the Danish army acknowledged the better tactical training of German units which was the result of a much longer service. It therefore doubted its own ability to succeed in mobile field operations and concluded that it needed the support of fortifications to fight successfully.

In January 1911 the navy had reinforced the determination of the army to seek the support of the Fortress as early as possible. Late 1909 the navy had been asked to estimate the time needed to land an army corps of 47,000 soldiers, 5,500 horses and 800 vehicles or artillery pieces at different places on the Zealand coasts. The navy concluded that around one hour after the transport fleet dropped anchor 800-1200 meters from the coast, 10,000 soldiers, a force of 300 cavalry and three batteries would have been landed. After six hours all infantry would be ashore, after nine hours all artillery, and after ten hours all cavalry. 12 hours after the invasion fleet’s arrival the full force would have landed. Only the navy’s future submarines would have any real effect against the landing fleet, and only if the landing took place in Køge Bay close to their Copenhagen base.

It is obvious that the analysis was completely theoretical without any basis in experiments under realistic conditions. The landing could either take place close to Copenhagen, in Faxe Bay, north or south of Korsør on the west coast, further north on the Great Belt coats or on the north coast of Zealand, from Kattegat.

The gloomy navy study proved to the army that it would be impossible to assemble a sufficiently strong force behind the coast in time to destroy the first landed elements before these were reinforced to become too powerful to be defeated. Not even an effective use of the dense rail network would permit the army to reinforce as quickly as the invading force. Thus the study undermined the one key element of Kühnell’s defence concept that made it attractive to liberal politicians: the view that the Zealand field army should deploy for coastal defence after mobilisation.

**Emerging distant heresy contained: Bornholm 1912**

The study confirmed the already firm pessimistic attitude of the General Staff of 1909-14. The staff’s doctrinaire views were illustrated by the reaction when it realised that the small conscript militia force on the distant Baltic island of Bornholm had plans to defend the island at the coast with the main effort at the harbours.

The locally mobilised strength of the militia (‘Bornholm’s Væbning’)
consisted of one infantry battalion, a cavalry squadron, a light machine gun company and a field battery of four 75 mm cannon. This force could be augmented with a ‘landstorm’ of up to 1,000 elderly trained as well as younger untrained conscripts organised in 5-7 companies. A small volunteer corps equipped with light machineguns (‘Bornholms Rekylgeværkorps’) joined the humble total just before the war.

The General Staff was not willing to allow the Bornholm Militia the freedom of action to defend forward. This in spite of local conditions that made sea landings and quick reinforcement of the landed force difficult. A large part of Bornholm’s coast consisted of rocky cliffs. Access to several of the harbours was through narrow channels difficult to navigate. Yet, the Militia should use the General Staff solution for Zealand. Different local conditions did not justify heresy.

During the summer of 1910, the staff sent a tactical reconnaissance team to the island to develop a proper plan in line with the Dogma. The militia was instructed to use only a small part of its mobile force for observation of the coast. Otherwise the forward defending force would be overwhelmed before the arrival some 4-5 hours later of the rest of the force. Instead, the militia should prepare a defended position, a ‘reduit’ at ‘Jomfrubjerget’, a rocky knoll in the central wooded area of ‘Almindingen’.

The planned final Bornholm Militia Command Post after proper education from Copenhagen: Hotel ‘Jomfrubjerget’ (meaning virgin’s mountain). 181
If the island was invaded the battalion should march to meet the enemy from a central position and thereafter delay the enemy advance towards the ‘reduit’, initially guarded by the less capable ‘landstorm’-force. Thereafter the ‘reduit’ should be used as a base for guerrilla-type activities.\textsuperscript{182}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image1}
\caption{From the exercise: ‘the enemy’ landing in Rønne harbour.}
\end{figure}

A relatively large scale field exercise was conducted in the autumn of 1912 in order to test the new, ideologically correct plan and probably to reward the militia for the loyal co-operation with the General Staff. Supervised by Berthelsen and King Christian, an ‘enemy’ force from Zealand was landed in Rønne harbour by the navy and thereafter successfully defeated by a Bornholm Militia that fought as directed.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image2}
\caption{From the exercise: field battery in the preplanned successful defence of the island.\textsuperscript{183}}
\end{figure}
Preparing the Fortress against the expected coup attempt

Within the army’s 1912 understanding of the threat, it was natural to focus the defence preparations on the remaining perceived weaknesses of the Copenhagen Fortress.

The improvement of the seaward defences proceeded with construction of the new forts and batteries authorised by the defence laws as well as by the improvement and rearmament of the older forts. When the work had been finished some years later following the arrival and installation of new modern foreign produced artillery, the seaward side of the fortress would be technically robust.

There was still a risk, however, that the infantry force necessary for the fortress defence would be prevented from reaching Copenhagen. Thus the Zealand Commanding General - designated to command the army and Fortress in war - issued new directives for the concentration of units mobilised in the provincial garrisons of Zealand to the capital. These directives covered both the worst case situation, where the units had to bypass German forces landed in Køge Bay, and a situation where concentration could proceed without enemy interference.¹⁸⁴

Even if all the conscripts from Zealand arrived unhindered by enemy action, the resulting force was considered too small to defend Copenhagen. The Zealand army needed conscripts from Jutland and Funen. However, the German Navy was expected to attack coastal garrison towns and cut communications between western and eastern Denmark at the start of hostilities. As a result the garrisons and the mobilisation facilities of the men from the western parts of the country had to be placed in Zealand. After the garrisons had been moved to the island, the trained conscripts could be called-up and transported to Zealand and arrive at their mobilisation depots before the German Navy intervened.

To keep the existing system would give the Germans plenty of time to block the move, as concentration of the field army in Zealand had to await the completion of mobilisation in garrisons west of the Great Belt.

The army pushed the politicians hard to advance the politically agreed transfer of units from vulnerable Jutland and Funen garrisons to garrisons in Zealand outside Copenhagen; new garrisons that Kühnell had considered necessary to ensure an early post-mobilisation forward deployment to the Zealand coast.

However, the move met intense resistance from towns earmarked to loose their garrisons. The government did not consider the international
situation urgent enough to justify the political cost and a confrontation between the Defence Minister and part of the army leadership over the issue led to the premature retirement of two generals and to the replacement of the involved reluctant Chief of General Staff with Palle Berthelsen.\textsuperscript{185}

The four parts, ‘Fronts’, of the Copenhagen Fortress - West, North, Coastal and South - received detailed instructions. The command relations between authorities inside the Fortress were clarified. The costs of mobilisation and the readying of the Fortress for defence and siege were established. The General Staff collected information about the total requirement for barbed wire in the preparation of the Fortress for defence.

The army considered it likely that an attack on Copenhagen would be attempted as a strategic coup. As the great powers maintained large forces in high combat readiness, they could launch a coup attack even prior to great power hostilities. The coastal artillery commander responsible for countering an attempt outlined the threat: ‘An assault against Copenhagen from the sea may have two forms: I.) A sudden arrival of an enemy squadron in the Sound that either seeks to become master of Copenhagen by taking the coastal works in a surprise boat - possibly combined with a bombardment of the forts - or by a bombardment of the works and the city. II.) By the landing in the harbour of Copenhagen or in the close proximity of the city.’\textsuperscript{186}

The commander of the Coastal ‘Front’ - the rear-admiral commanding the Copenhagen Seaward Defence - reacted to the coup threat by clarifying his instructions and adjusting deployments, even if he doubted that an assault could come without any warning.\textsuperscript{187} Small harbours along the sea front of Copenhagen were being prepared blocked by booms.

**Discreet dissent in far-away Jutland**

In 1912 Tuxen, the new Commanding General in Jutland-Funen examined his defence requirements with an open mind. The immediate problem seemed to be to cover Esbjerg in a way that would remove any German urge to do this itself. When Gørtz agreed that the Jutland army could leave its initial ‘Central Position’ in the Viborg-Randers area after it was ready, Tuxen planned for the concentration of \( \frac{3}{4} \) of the Jutland forces in and south-east of Esbjerg. Tuxen also asked for the construction of a permanent battery covering the access to Esbjerg harbour.\textsuperscript{188} Later, as the Western Powers gained control over the North Sea, the harbours of Skagen, Frederikshavn...
and possibly Thyborøn had to be covered as well. After the German Navy in the North Sea had been defeated decisively, the Jutland army might have to fight a delaying action against a possible major landing in the Skagen-Frederikshavn area. When the western navies reached Kattegat, the north-eastern Jutland fiords should be closed.\textsuperscript{189}

Tuxen stuck to his plan for a possible concentration towards Esbjerg even after Gørtz changed his mind, and the option to concentrate the Jutland forces forward to Esbjerg remained valid to the end of the war.\textsuperscript{190}

\textit{Tuxen’s heretical August 1912 plan for the Jutland Corps concentration in the Esbjerg area.}\textsuperscript{191}

In February 1913 Gørtz wrote that a concentration around Esbjerg could be seen as being directed against England and thus in conflict with a neutral Danish posture. He also argued that the Esbjerg deployment would place the Jutland land force in a forward and thus exposed position in case of a German invasion. Germany could - no matter what Denmark did - use insufficient number of Danish forces in Jutland as a pretext for invading.

Esbjerg was distant to the General Staff concerns, and a deployment against a possible British operation was heresy. A defence effort here was
as unrelated to the main Danish army priorities as the defence of the area around Flushing and the access to Antwerp was to the Dutch army. \(^{192}\) Therefore a permanent coastal fort at Esbjerg was never seriously considered.

The Esbjerg issue was only one of the problems related to the defence of Jutland. Most of Tuxen's work had to be directed at the planning and preparation for mobile delaying operations on the way north from the border as well as at a final effort on the peninsular at the Limfjord island of Mors. \(^{193}\) The initial mobile operations, the protection and execution of the Limfjord crossing and the organisation of the final defence on Mors ‘reduit’, remained the main issues for the Jutland army until 1918.

**Balkan War crisis to Great War**

During the Balkan War crisis Defence Council meeting on 16\(^{th}\) November 1912, Gørtz agreed that Denmark aimed all efforts to maintain its neutrality. She would have to be forced to leave that neutrality by an attack that could either take her to the side of the attacker or force her to side with the opponent. He only dealt with those two possibilities in his statement.

Gørtz now accepted that the Royal Navy would only be able to operate in Danish waters after a weakening of the German Navy. Germany would find it easier to gain and thereafter maintain control of the Straits if she acted before Denmark was prepared. Such a control would require the capture of Zealand with Copenhagen. The occupation of Jutland would not be required, as it wasn't sufficient for the mission. The deepest channel in the Great Belt could only be controlled from Zealand. As soon as a war between Germany and England became likely, the authorised neutrality guard force should be called up. The full force should be mobilised no later than the moment when war became reality. If mobilisation had been completed, a landing on Zealand was unlikely, at least until the time when England decided to use the Straits to get access to attacking the German Baltic coast. \(^{194}\)

In the first crisis meeting one week earlier the army had outlined its situation. The prepared neutrality guard on Zealand would amount to around 17,500, and the fully mobilised land force on the island to a little less than 80,000. \(^{195}\) During the 16\(^{th}\) November meeting the Chief of the General Staff, Berthelsen, outlined the shortcomings in the army. The stocks of ammunition and barbed wire were much below the required level. The army
needed ‘anti-balloon guns’, searchlights for the fortifications, uniforms, mobile radio stations for the formation headquarters and several other items. The regular officer cadre was too weak. The army was looking for the possibility to establish field fortifications on civilian owned land. The most important problem was the so-called ‘Gap in the North Front’ of the Fortress. The existing northern fortifications and the considerable prepared defensive inundations were now placed too close to the city centre and in an increasingly built-up upmarket part of northern Copenhagen. Between the northernmost of the modern ‘Fortunenfort’ and the Sound lay ‘Dyrehaven’: the deer park, the recreational wooded area used by the Copenhagen population for summer outings. The idea to build new fortifications forward of the existing ones had been rejected by the politicians in 1909. On the contrary, the existing land-side works would be abandoned in 1922. Closing the ‘Gap’ could therefore not be done or financed within the framework of the existing law. However, the army saw the measure as essential, and a defence collection was organised among patriotic citizens, (‘Forsvarsindsamlingen af 1913’), exploiting the patriotic sentiment created by the urgency. Guided by the defence laws, the Defence Minister blocked the use of the funds collected for the line of fortifications through the ‘Dyrehaven’, but the patriotic feeling was strong enough for additional money to be collected for the purchase of some of the equipment identified by the army as other critical shortcomings.

Gørtz did try on 7th February 1913 to use the patriotic sentiment to obtain a political decision to have the ‘Gap’ closed, but failed. However, he successfully used the Balkan War crisis to force the ministry to start the unpopular transfer of garrisons from Jutland-Funen to Zealand. In mid-January 1913 General Gørtz had found the situation ripe. The decision, the construction of new barracks and the move of units and stores, happened during the following months.

Preparing as planned: August to December 1914

During the first months of the war, the army worked hard to realise its plans for the defence of Zealand - as well as for Jutland to the extent allowed by the very limited resources spared for the peninsular.

The international crisis had worsened on 31st July 1914. At noon the German government declared ‘Kriegsgefahrzustand’ (risk of war condition). The Danish government turned down Gørtz’ proposal to establish
the full neutrality guard force. However, during the evening it did authorise the call-up of readiness crews for the Copenhagen coastal forts and for the navy neutrality guard. The cabinet thus acted within the threat perception of the army by creating an ability to counter a German coup landing in Copenhagen harbour prior to outbreak of great power hostilities. The army prepared an emergency use of the unfinished artificial island 'Saltholmflakfort', the likewise uncompleted 'Dragørfort' on the east coast of Amager and the reinforcement of the 'Middelgrundfort' blocking the northern entrance to the Copenhagen harbour.\textsuperscript{201} The army engineers updated their obstacle and field fortification plans for the defence of the Copenhagen harbour front against a coup landing close to the city centre.

\textit{Blueprints of 31/7 1914 for blocking Tuborg Harbour and for field fortifications on the nearby sea front.}\textsuperscript{202}

On 1\textsuperscript{st} August it became clear that Germany would mobilise, and at 16.30 the Danish cabinet ordered the call-up of the neutrality guard for Zealand and the prepared ‘Forøget Fredsstyrke I’ (Augmented Peace Force level I) for Jutland-Funen. The Zealand force was planned to be of 16.000,
including 9-10.000 infantry from Jutland-Funen to ensure their safe ar-
rial before the possible German interdiction of the cross-Belt traffic. The
planned force in Jutland-Funen was limited to 2.500. The mission of the
neutrality guard was to meet the feared surprise attack against the capital
as well as protect the mobilisation of the provincial garrisons and the
concentration of the army to Copenhagen. Detachments should guard the
land border, possible landing places, traffic infrastructure as well as forti-
fications. The planned strengthening of Copenhagen Fortress with field
works and artillery started immediately.

On 2nd August the army in Jutland-Funen received the directives that
would remain in force until the end of the war. The small force’s first
mission was to protect the mobilisation and the transit of the called-up
conscripts to Zealand. The second mission was to prevent violations of
the neutrality by border detachments with ‘a couple of cannon’ at Esbjerg
and Fredericia and smaller detachments to Frederikshavn and Aarhus. In
case of mobilisation, the Jutland main force should concentrate to the area
Viborg-Randers and prepare for a withdrawal to its ‘base’ in the part of
Jutland north of the Limfjord. The situation should decide if the island of
Mors or another place would be the final refuge. Any field works in Jutland
that required public funds had to be specifically authorised by the Ministry
of War. Tuxen’s directive followed two days later. The two border deta-
chments would consist each of two infantry companies, a dragoon squa-
dron and a half battery of light field cannon. The Aarhus and Fredericia
detachments should be limited to infantry platoons. Half a company would
deploy at the Nyborg ferry harbour and smaller forces to Strib (on Funen at
the Little Belt) and the harbour of Grenaa to protect the infrastructure and
thus the mobilisation to Zealand. Other small detachments would guard
the railways at Skanderborg and Skjern. The border detachments and a
couple of the smaller detachments were later enlarged. Otherwise the pat-
tern of deployment remained unchanged throughout the war.

At midnight 4th-5th August England declared war against Germany. The
worst case scenario had become reality. On the morning of 5th August the
crisis group met to discuss a report that the German Navy was mining the
southern end of the Great Belt. The immediate decision was to augment
the force in Jutland by calling-up ‘Forøget Fredsstyrke II’ (Augmented Peace
Force, level II) that added 6.000 to the force and gave the planned total of
8.500. In reality the total in Jutland-Funen remained above that number
during the first year of the war. During the continued meeting the par-
ticipants were informed about the German request to Denmark to block the Great Belt. After the decision has been taken to do as requested, the government decided to increase the force in Zealand by calling-up the conscripts of the 2nd-8th annual classes from the Zealand Group of Islands (Zealand, Lolland, Falster, Møen). Gørtz had asked for full mobilisation; however the decision taken would make it possible to fill the regular ‘line’ force up to wartime strength. The King argued that full mobilisation might be considered a provocation by Germany and had suggested a more limited additional call-up.

The details of implementing the decision of reinforcing the neutrality guard were left to Berthelsen, and the number actually called-up created a surplus that made it possible not only to fill the regular units. It also allowed the establishment of the reserve infantry battalions at half their war-time strength. The total strength became more than 47,000, about three times the authorised neutrality guard and close to 60% of the planned mobilised force. This made it possible to leave the task of guarding the fortress to the reserve infantry regiments as foreseen by Kühnell. However, the regular units of the small 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions would stay concentrated for training or other missions just in front of the Fortress. Only the larger 3rd Infantry Division made up of the regiments moved from Jutland-Funen in 1913 detached elements to guard exposed coasts and harbours on Zealand south and west of Copenhagen and prepared to meet any landing further away from the capital prior to its early withdrawal to the Fortress.

Obsolescent 15 cm mobile gun placed in the permanent Tinghøj Battery on the fortress’ North Front.
With a strong force called-up, the army proceeded with the planned reinforcement of the Fortress with field fortifications in front and between the permanent works. Mobile fortress and field pieces as well as machineguns were added to the fixed armament of the permanent works. Supplementary field works were added, armed and manned.\textsuperscript{212}

The large number of conscripts called-up by the army made it possible to fill the Reserve Infantry Regiments enough for use as Copenhagen Fortress Infantry. Mature conscripts from 47\textsuperscript{th} Reserve Infantry Battalion deployed in the Fortress field fortified front line across the island of Amager - with members of the local population.\textsuperscript{213}

Late August 1914 the preparations were far enough progressed for the army to move on to the next key requirements. The war would apparently not be decided as quickly as expected. The neutrality guard might have to be maintained during the winter. It would be necessary to find better accommodation than tents for the fort gunners and infantry. On 8\textsuperscript{th} September the Engineer Commander asked for the construction of wooden huts in the coastal forts.\textsuperscript{214}

The expected German surprise landing with a limited force in the harbour or south of the capital had not happened. The remaining foreseen possibility was the landing of a force strong enough to conduct a formal siege of Copenhagen. It was therefore now logical to move on from
the reinforcement of the existing permanent fortifications to closing the ‘North Front Gap’. Late August Gørtz had asked for an updated plan for the work. On 28th August he had received the plan, and during the crisis group meeting with the minister on 31st August, he asked for Munch’s authority to start the construction work. This was rejected with the argument that it would be contrary to the 1909 laws. The fact that the laws had been created for peacetime was seen as irrelevant. Admiral Kofoed-Hansen, who had inspected the ‘Gap’ on bicycle the previous day, wrote in his diary that the minister’s response proved that ‘Denmark was a mad-house’.\textsuperscript{215}

The government discussed the request on 1st September. The reconsidered response of the minister was more positive, ‘if the work could be done in a reasonable way’, and he was supported by the inner cabinet.\textsuperscript{216} By ‘reasonable’ the government meant ‘field’ rather than ‘permanent’ works. On 2nd September the issue was discussed in the crisis group again, and the following day Berthelsen took the Prime and Defence Ministers on a guided tour of the ‘Gap’ to discuss the project in place. Four days later, on 7th September, the authority was given by the War Ministry to start the work. During the following months a trench system reinforced with concrete positions were established, not only in the ‘Dyrehaven’, but also further west. The costs were covered by the funds collected for that purpose by the ‘1913 Defence Collection’.\textsuperscript{217}

**Fall of Antwerp causes Tune Position project**

Operations during the war had shown the power of the new super-heavy siege artillery. The modernisation of the Belgian National Redoubt around Antwerp from 1906 onwards had been seen by the army as a model for Denmark. The initial attack by German field army forces in early September had been repulsed. However, the new Belgian forts had only been built to take bombardment of artillery up to a calibre of 27 cm. Late September the German renewed the attack supported by 30, 5 and 42cm mortars.

One of the new Belgian forts was destroyed by one shell that hit the fort ammunition dump. After a few days the combat was over. The Belgian defenders capitulated as did the British troops that had been sent as reinforcements. What was left of the Belgian army retreated to the western corner of the country to spend the time until autumn 1918 behind water obstacles and field fortifications. The time of national redoubts like Antwerp and Copenhagen seemed over.
On 12th October 1914 Munch asked Gørtz what conclusions the army had drawn from the quick fall of the Belgian redoubt. He could not give a clear answer. Berthelsen answered that the war had demonstrated the value of field fortifications. Munch asked if coastal defence was planned, without the generals being able to answer. It was a logical question. If Copenhagen Fortress had been proven useless by the fall of its larger Antwerp ideal, it would be logical to meet an invasion at the coast as recommended.
by the Liberal Reform Party, but rejected by Kühnell’s disciples. Munch was deliberately twisting the knife in an open wound.

On 27th October Tuxen concluded in his letter to Gørtz that he considered Copenhagen Fortress doomed.

Fortress Antwerp in late September 1914 just prior to the fall.
The shock of this external event triggered the initial Tune Position proposal.  

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On 3rd December 1914 the army artillery commander - the 'Artillery General' - emphasised the need to establish new fortifications in front of the 'Vestvolden', the western part of Copenhagen Fortress, and two days the British did send reinforcements to Antwerp, as the Danish Army had assumed would have been the case if Germany had attacked Copenhagen. Both Royal Marines and naval ratings untrained for land combat like these were deployed in the futile attempt to defend the Fortress.\textsuperscript{221}

The army lacked modern medium and heavy field and fortress artillery. The ad hoc 12 cm Field Howitzer Group was created as emergency gap filler.\textsuperscript{223}

On 3\textsuperscript{rd} December 1914 the army artillery commander - the 'Artillery General' - emphasised the need to establish new fortifications in front of the 'Vestvolden', the western part of Copenhagen Fortress, and two days
later he requested the immediate rearmament of the heavy mobile artillery with 96 modern pieces (36 12cm cannon and 56 15cm howitzers). A new forward line would make it possible to counter the employment of very heavy siege batteries within reach of the city centre by covering advanced positions of the rather obsolete and short range Danish fortress artillery. Modern artillery was essential for both the fortress and the field army.\textsuperscript{222}

Gørtz concluded immediately\textsuperscript{224} that a new position should be established across the land bridge between Køge Bay and Roskilde Fiord, covering the approach from the western and southern parts of Zealand towards north-eastern part of the island with Copenhagen. However, even if the Commander’s decision to seek the construction of the new defence line came quickly, the formal recommendation to the ministry had to wait.

The reason for the deliberate procedure was probably a combination of two factors. The sense of urgency had disappeared. Nothing had happened as the army had predicted and feared during the first four months of the war. The other factor was that Gørtz had good reasons to be pessimistic about the chances to get ministry approval for such a massive project.

The idea to have a defensive position between Køge Bay and Roskilde Fiord had been around for more than 30 years.\textsuperscript{225} Such a position had also been proposed in 1905 during the Defence Commission deliberations\textsuperscript{226} and again in 1909 as a compromise between the opponents of the fortress and the supporters of its reinforcement during the final phase of political discussions before the defence laws had been agreed. I.C. Christensen, who had been Defence Minister at the time, had rejected the idea as unacceptable to his voters.\textsuperscript{227} Gørtz had been the Chief of General Staff when the proposal had been rejected. The ‘anti-militaristic’ Peter Munch was not likely to be more positive than Christensen.

During the first weeks of 1915 a confrontation between Gørtz and Munch about Munch’s interference with army discipline was close to the culmination point. On 21\textsuperscript{st} January 1915 Gørtz handed in his resignation and thereby forced the minister to stop his open activities in direct support of the conscripts against their superiors.\textsuperscript{228} Finally Munch had to live up to the promise given by the new Prime Minister to the King in the summer of 1913.\textsuperscript{229}

The minister’s climb down was not likely to make him more forthcoming the next time the army proposed major defence improvements such as a new expensive forward position.
Forced retreat to the Tune Position
Detailed consideration of the possibility only started half a year later. The first General Staff reconnaissance of the position took place in late summer 1915 with a report finished on 4th September. A recommendation to the ministry was sent on 11th September followed on 20th September by letter a with a rough budget. The recommendation used a developed version of the artillery commander’s argument of December 1914. The planners knew that a supporting position would have to be established to protect the right flank and back of the proposed position. It would have to be built either along the full length of the eastern coast of the Roskilde Fiord or across the Horns Herred Peninsular and along the southern part of the fiord’s east coast. However, this extra requirement was omitted from the letter to the ministry. There was no reason to reduce further the already very limited chances of a positive answer.

The discussion in the inner cabinet about the proposal started on 17th September. The construction might make it possible to reduce the size of the neutrality guard further, and it might move a decisive combat away from Copenhagen. The new position would implicitly highlight the irrelevance of the Fortress, thus underlining that the liberals had been right in their critical views. There would also be disadvantages. The Foreign Minister Erik Scavenius was asked about his opinion. He proved to be critical of the project. Any additional defence effort could be seen as anti-German.

During late summer that year Gørtz and Berthelsen had been criticised by leading officers for being too weak in their handling of the social-liberal Defence Minister. As suspected by Berthelsen, the leader of the campaign was the General Inspector of Cavalry, Major-General Castenschiold.

Major-General Holten Castenschiold, Cavalry Inspector and leader of the officer cabal against the army command to have it removed causing the fall of the hated government.
The campaign against the army chiefs was meant as an indirect attack on the minister and the government. On 21st September the leading conservative politician count Holstein-Holsteinborg openly supported the criticism in the press.

Gørtz now felt an acute need to defend his achievements to the parliament; however the Defence Minister rejected the idea. He would present the situation himself. This happened on 22nd October in a closed session. During the presentation the minister informed the parties about the army’s Tune Position proposal, and of the government’s intention to accept the idea if nobody disagreed. I.C. Christensen gave his party’s support one week later, and on 2nd November Scavenius called Munch to praise him for the way that he had ‘paralysed the complaints’.236

By accepting the ‘Tune-position’, in its view a small and irrelevant concession, the government had effectively parried the attack via the army leadership.

The positive answer from the government led to the preparation of the next step, the flank defence along the Roskilde Fiord. The day after the 22nd October meeting, the General Staff received a proposal from the Army Engineer Command for a position across the Horns Herred peninsular. Two months later the staff had prepared a full report about the requirements for a position along the fiord.237

In August 1915 the army had an additional motive - an important operational reason - to seek the construction of the Tune Position. During the months after August 1914, the regular units of 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions had gradually deployed further and further away from the Fortress. The initial moves had taken the 1st Division to North-East Zealand north of Copenhagen, primarily to spread the heavy burden of quartering the troops on the population. 2nd Division had moved south towards Køge. The reserve regiments continued to supply the infantry for the Fortress and the larger 3rd Infantry Division remained in its forward deployments with detachments on coasts and in harbours, prepared to register landings and protect the mobilisation in the provincial garrisons.

In May 1915 the army was ready to take the next step forward. The work on the Fortress and the North Front Gap had progressed enough to free 2nd Division for deployment to the Stevns peninsular south of the capital with the ability to meet a sea landing in Faxe Bay.238 The units of the division covering Køge were being replaced by the regular battalion of the Foot Guards. The elements of the division in cantonments close to Faxe
started the unfamiliar activity of considering how to defend a coast.

The whole foundation of this deliberate and careful, limited forward deployment was the still very significant strength of the army neutrality guard in Zealand, and especially the availability of the reserve infantry units. They guarded the Fortress and freed the regular units for forward use as Kühnell had recommended. Yet, the there are indications that the reasons for the move forward in early 1915 may not only have been professional. The move also created a politically visible justification for continuing the burden of the large neutrality guard. The actual preparations for coastal defence at Faxe seemed more driven by the pulling of the ambitious local regimental commander\textsuperscript{239} than by the determination and urgency of the General Staff.\textsuperscript{240}

However, all efforts to counter the political pressure were in vain. From early June the social-liberal government had been freed to concentrate on having the army neutrality guard reduced. When it came to power in 1913 the key objective had been to have the Danish Constitution liberalised.

\textit{Main ‘mission’ accomplished. The government celebrated the new Constitution with a poster showing its members.}\textsuperscript{241}
The new constitution was signed on 6th June 1915 by the King, and two weeks later the Defence Minister had succeeded in getting the support of both the King and the other parties for a significant reduction of the Zealand neutrality guard. The minister used the fact that the stocks of both rifle and field artillery ammunition were desperately low.

The stocks of ammunition in Denmark had been considered too low even before the war. In 1915 all belligerents had been surprised by the unexpected extremely high consumption of ammunition in the extended and intensive positional war. The required levels had proved far above pre-war expectations. This highlighted the gravity of the Danish shortages. The situation was similar in other neutral states.242

Munch linked the government’s support for a fact-finding and purchasing mission to the U.S. to the army’s political supporters’ acceptance of a significant neutrality guard reduction. The agreement with the parties had been reached on 1st July. The force would be reduced by 7,000 in August and further 7,000 in November. The army leadership had been openly out-manoeuvred - and in the eyes of the army humiliated - by Munch. This was probably the main source of unhappiness with the army leadership among army officers that culminated in the senior officers’ cabal two months later.243

The decision to reduce the size of the neutrality guard meant that the reserve battalions would return to full mobilisation status. The regular 1st and 2nd Divisions would now have to detach regular infantry units to the Fortress, tying the two formations closely to Copenhagen. The limited and probably half-hearted forward deployment had to be terminated.

A new way of adding a forward defensive buffer to the Fortress had to be developed. This is the most likely reason why the army vitalised the Tune-Position idea in the summer of 1915.244 In spite of Gørtz’ immediate approval of the idea, the project had only remained as an undeveloped option during the first half of 1915. Now it was urgently needed to support the endurance of the Copenhagen defences in spite of the neutrality guard reductions.

Semi-panic at Køge Bay
The first half year after the authorisation of the Tune Position, the army concentrated on its construction. It had realised from the experience gathered after the 1914 field reinforcement works at the Fortress that it had
to include a massive draining effort. Otherwise the works would be unusable for most of the year. This time the work took place in winter and the demanding draining part of the project had to be created in parallel with the digging of the trenches and the construction of the reinforced concrete weapons and command positions. The intense effort seems to have closed the mind of the army leadership to other developments, including the worsening situation in the Danish waters linked to the British submarine war in the Baltic.

The German Navy had reacted to incursions by laying minefields and establishing net obstacles in the Sound in the autumn of 1915 as well as by keeping a significant naval force in Køge Bay. As already mentioned in the navy story, the Danish Navy reacted in February 1916 to a German request to supplement their minefields and the repeated violations of the airspace over Copenhagen Fortress by the establishment of its own minefield off the Amager east coast.

The army only gradually realised the implications of the new situation. Late March 1916 a General Staff memorandum discussed the vulnerability
of the Tune Position to flanking fire from heavy German naval artillery and recommended the construction of a new coastal fort at the Køge Bay coast to reduce that threat. On 19th April the army sought navy support for a different organisation of the new Dragør coastal fort artillery. The changes should make it possible to counter German mining of the gap between the German minefield and the Amager coast. The next week the infantry battalion responsible for the southern part of Amager alerted its superiors to the landing threat from the German navy just off the coast of the island. The message reached Army Headquarters on 28th April.

On that day Gørtz noted in a letter to Tuxen that the threat from the German naval force had been worsened by the arrival of the battleship ‘Hessen’ and 50 large barges. The presence of the mine barrier and the German force meant that the Danish Navy was buttoned-up in Copenhagen without any real possibility to operate in the Køge Bay: ‘... it is an uncomfortable feeling to have all these barges so close in, so close to the beach of Amager, where the first defensive line has now been placed.’

The main defences on Amager had initially been placed in an east-west line across the centre of the island. The southern coast had only been covered by pickets and patrols. However, the new coastal works on the southern coast authorised by the 1909 defence laws were being constructed. In spite of the general aversion to coastal defences, the army had accepted in 1915 that the main defence line was moved forward to connect and support these coastal artillery works.

In a letter from 17th May, the Chief of the General Staff remarked that the landing threat from the German force was directed against both Amager and the Køge Bay coast, and this insight was repeated on the following day by Gørtz. As already mentioned, the Danish Navy conceded in June 1916 that the German minefields blocked its submarine operations in Køge Bay, and early that month the army doubled the infantry in southern Amager to two battalions, and an additional battalion was sent to the Køge area. The army had now realised that the left flank of the Tune Position was not only vulnerable to heavy naval bombardment. It could be rolled-up from its left flank by a force landing at Køge Harbour or even in its rear on the Køge Bay coast. This provoked a feeling of acute crisis. 1st Division was given responsibility for countering landings and for the initial defence in the Tune Position. On 3rd June the Division Commander asked for authority to take command of the units of 3rd Division working on the position. He asked to have the approach to Køge harbour blocked with chains and a
couple of submarines stationed there. He also asked to have the navy’s coastal observation posts to the south-east on the Stevns peninsular and the island of Møn reporting directly to the Division.²⁵³

On 9ᵗʰ June Army Headquarters tried to calm the 1ˢᵗ Division Commander, Major-General Andreas Ludvig Hansen, but in vain. On the next day he repeated his requests and added: ‘The nearly two years exhausting service – for many combined with difficult economic conditions – has by its character been tiring and dulled the senses, especially the guard duties, where parts may have been of doubtful value. The importance of the guarding and combat mission given to me is so clear that all understands it. Its effects are therefore stimulating, if measures of self-evident use are taken. On the other hand it can become depressing, if it proves impossible to create relatively favourable conditions for success.’²⁵⁵ The General was implicitly criticising the army leadership. Around 13ᵗʰ June the responsibility for developing the new mission was transferred to 2ⁿᵈ Division. Its commander, Major-General Peter William Ibsen was regarded as the best and most astute combat commander in the army.²⁵⁶

On 16ᵗʰ June the navy informed the army that it was only willing to keep one of the old torpedo boats or patrol boats from the Copenhagen Seaward Defences on station off Køge.²⁵⁸ During the following days
a thin defensive screen under a battalion commander was deployed on the coast. The unfinished ‘Mosede’ coastal battery was integrated into the defences. A reinforced battalion of the same regiment as the first deployed battalion took responsibility for the defence of Køge Harbour. 3rd Division, the formation meant to cover the rest of Zealand, made a third of its infantry available for the mission of meeting a landing and defending the Tune Position against an attempt to take its left part by a surprise attack.\(^{259}\)

On 23rd June General Ibsen was ready with his mission analysis. He considered it unlikely that he would succeed in blocking a landing. The army was still doubtful of its ability to defend effectively on the coast, even in a situation like this where the defending forces could be present on the beach and immediately behind the coast. The battalions from 3rd Division were likely to use 4-6 hours for their deployment to the landing area, thus arriving too late.\(^{260}\)

The 1st Division commander remained in a state of near panic during the next months. The defence against a landing was considered totally inadequate. Exposed to this fundamental pessimism the General Staff tried to convince General Hansen that he overestimated the capacity of Køge Harbour. The staff sought expert advice from the navy to reinforce its own somewhat more relaxed estimate.\(^{261}\)

On 12th July 1916 Army Headquarters issued its final directive for the mission of the division headquarters responsible for meeting a landing: ‘In case of the success of an enemy landing between Køge and the Tune Position, you are to concentrate the force under your command to the Position. Thereafter and until further orders you take command of the Position and hold it. ...’ \(^{262}\)

A successful defence of the coast would depend on the effectiveness
of 'Mosede' coastal battery. During the following period the arming of the battery and the ammunition supply was given a very high priority, and its weapons were reconstructed for use against a landing force rather than as originally against ships in the Køge Bay. Additional works were thereafter constructed on the coast outside the battery itself. 263

During the next year the mission of guarding the Køge Bay coast and defending the Tune Position against a German coup landing from the sea remained the main initial mission of the Danish Army. The command re-
responsibility initially rotated between 1st and 2nd Division. Half a year later 3rd Division was included in the rotation, removing the formation from the mission of covering Zealand outside the Copenhagen area. Late October the Tune Position was ready to become the main defensive position of the Copenhagen defence. The reserve infantry regiments that had hitherto been dedicated to supply the infantry for the West, North and South Fronts of the Fortress on mobilisation were now to be used to form two new infantry divisions, the 4th and 5th, meant to man the Tune Position trenches after mobilisation.

**Dogma planning: the secret evacuation of Funen**

One of the continuing themes of the correspondence between Tuxen on one side and Gørtz and Berthelsen on the other was the distribution of the field army between the different parts of the country. Tuxen thought and argued that Jutland was more exposed than Zealand and Copenhagen to operational level violations in the existing strategic state of affairs. In one letter he even noted that the situation was as faulty as in 1807, where the field army stood in Schleswig-Holstein expecting to fight Napoleon, when the British landed near Copenhagen, bombarded the city and stole the fleet.

Tuxen could find good use for 3rd Division – the most powerful of the three Zealand divisions – in Jutland. His point of view was totally unacceptable to Gørtz and Berthelsen. After some letters a common formula was found: the troop level in Jutland was 3-4 times too high for only a marking of sovereignty and far from what was required for a proper defence effort. Both sides could also agree that the reinforced infantry regiment in Funen was not strong enough for any real defence effort and it was four times the level needed for only marking neutrality. After a heated exchange of letters Berthelsen concluded on 30th June 1916 that ‘... especially after we have got the Tune Position’ there was ‘... a serious requirement for troops to defend the more vital parts of the country’, in such a situation there were ‘... too many troops in Jutland and especially in Funen’.

The island commander in Funen, the 6th Infantry Regiment Commander, Colonel Ramming, agreed that his force was too weak to defend against an enemy landing. Neither a British landing on the island’s north coast nor a German crossing of the Little Belt could be properly countered. On 7th September 1916 Ramming recommended to Tuxen that in the first case
The proposed evacuation anchorage at Korshavn with protective works at point 71 and at Hesselbjerg.\(^{272}\)

(a British landing) the Funen force should be evacuated by shipping assembled in Svendborg. If the Germans crossed Little Belt, the force should leave from Korshavn at the northern Fyens Hoved tip of the Hindsholm peninsular. Some bridgehead field fortifications should be constructed immediately to protect the possible embarkation. In the margin of Ramming’s recommendation, Tuxen noted that the force would not get away if it committed to combat.\(^{271}\)

On 12\(^{th}\) September Tuxen noted in a top secret official letter to Army Headquarters that it was wrong to use 8 percent of the army’s infantry in Funen. It should be decided in advance if 6\(^{th}\) Regiment should deploy on mobilisation to Zealand or Jutland.\(^{273}\) Two weeks later Army Headquarters informed Tuxen that it had decided to move three quarters of the Funen
force – 2 regular and 1 reserve battalions – to Zealand no later than at mobilisation. Tuxen’s headquarters was ordered to prepare the move in utmost secrecy. On 29th September Tuxen ordered Colonel Ramming to develop the evacuation plan. Nobody but the colonel himself should know the purpose of the planning. On 10th October Ramming sent the draft plan and one week later he had it back with hand written comments followed three days later with instructions for the evacuation of ammunition from a local Funen factory.

On 9th December 1916 the evacuation plan and the directive to the new designated commander of the ‘Funen Detachment’ was ready. The evacuation would take place by rail and ferry. It could take the form of moving the 6th Regiment personnel and mobilisation stores before mobilisation. The alternative was to deploy the units to Zealand after mobilisation. The remaining reserve battalion would use the main part of its force in platoon size detachments to the main coastal towns, keeping the rest as reserve in Odense. Tuxen forwarded the approved evacuation plan to Army Headquarters on the day of Christmas Eve 1916.

The Great Belt had a central role in the 1909 defence laws, in the post August 1914 navy deployment - as well as in all German contingency planning against Denmark. This plan to evacuate the western Great Belt coast illustrates how far the post-Kühnell Dogma group-think had removed the army leadership from any joint defence effort with the navy. The planning took place unrelated to the 1916 strategic situation and domestic political realities. No matter what happened, only the Fortress mattered. Everything else was waste and heresy.

Colonel E P G Ramming, the Island Commander Funen, who inadvertently triggered the planned evacuation of his force to Zealand.
**Jutland threatened and ignored**

In August 1916 Germany had started operational planning against Denmark and Norway. The fighting at Verdun from February onwards, the crisis on the south-eastern front produced by the Russian Brusilov offensive in June and the unexpected heavy losses at Somme from July onwards had nearly exhausted German manpower reserves. Romania’s entry into the war in August proved the opportunism of the neutrals. As the unlimited submarine warfare was being considered, the possibility of British desperation leading to landings on the Jutland peninsular had to be faced and prepared for. With the critical manpower situation even the addition of a mobilised Danish Army of around 100,000 to Germany’s enemies might be critical. As a result of this acute feeling of vulnerability a line of field fortifications was constructed in North Schleswig, and the German forces started contingency planning for a quick capture of parts of Jutland to preempt British forces or counter these forces, if they came first.

The Danish Army followed the preparations closely. The critical situation was openly discussed in the German military press, the Danish Foreign Ministry warned that the reaction in Berlin to Romania’s entry was tense and that members of the Danish minority acted as the ears and eyes of the Danish Army Intelligence.

The army in Jutland had been seeking approval and funding to improve
the weak bridgehead fortifications south of the Limfiorden crossing points. On 20th September Munch rejected the proposal. The local Danish newspapers would notice the work and write about them, and the Germans would register the preparations and see them as hostile. Mid- November 1916 the government discussed further significant reductions in the army neutrality guard. The Foreign Minister remarked that any reduction would be welcomed by the Germans. The army was known to be hostile towards Germany. When the unlimited submarine campaign had been declared at the end of January 1917, the Foreign Minister urged the Defence Minister to block any Danish military reactions.

Initially the Danish forces were unaware of the German offensive preparations. However, on 3rd February the army leadership realised that the German build-up was offensive and directed against Denmark. The two German divisions just south of the border had received pontoon equipment and been given maps of the Danish part of the Jutland. There were even rumours that the British delegation in Copenhagen prepared to leave for Sweden. Gørtz was also aware of the link to British naval operations in Danish waters. He understood that even a reinforced Royal Navy presence in the Kattegat ‘... might lead to serious complications for us...’

However, as the generals agreed with Kofoed-Hansen, who saw a Brit-
ish naval offensive in Danish waters as unlikely, there was no acute sense of crisis. The information received during these days in early February 1917 underlined in a very clear way the German perception. Control of Jutland was a strategic necessity in case of a British offensive against Germany via Denmark. This, however, did not lead to any critical reconsideration of the ‘Dogma’. No German offensive could be limited to Jutland. It had to be combined with an operation against Zealand.

Initially the German planned land operations had been limited to a move forward from the defensive positions in North Schleswig, occupying the Esbjerg area as well as Fredericia to ensure free German naval use of the Little Belt. No army operations were foreseen against Zealand. The
possible naval and aerial bombardment of Copenhagen was meant to fix the strong Danish forces around the capital and thus keep them away from Jutland. Initially the planned German operations had been constrained by the scarcity of land forces, but in May 1917 the situation improved. The French offensive had failed completely, and the Russian Army was on the brink of becoming destabilised by the increasingly effective Bolshevik campaign against the war and for soldier participation in the poor peasant occupation of noble estates. Next month’s version of the plan foresaw the occupation of Jutland, not only a limited deployment to secure Esbjerg and Fredericia. In late March 1918, the planning even included the occupation of Funen.

After the collapse of Russia and the early victories in the spring 1918 offensive on the Western Front, the planning against Denmark may no longer have been limited to being a contingency plan triggered by a British operation against Norway or towards the Baltic Sea. Hereafter it could be seen as part of the plan to use the advantageous military situation to get full strategic control over Northern Europe.\textsuperscript{292} It is not unlikely that a move to consolidate the existing strategic control over Denmark would have followed shortly after an operational victory on the Western Front. The spring 1918 version of the German plan ‘Fall J’ had for obvious reasons several elements in common with the ‘Weserübung Süd’-planning of 1940.\textsuperscript{293}

As the German Naval Attaché for the Nordic States concluded in his strategic analysis memo to Berlin on 20\textsuperscript{th} December 1917: ‘Denmark comprises (in the move to get control over Scandinavia) the first and nearly completed phase.’\textsuperscript{294}

\textbf{Kühnells disciples outmanoeuvred}

During the first half of 1917, the government attempted to press or ‘bribe’ the army leadership to accept a reduction of the neutrality guard. Funds for infrastructure and equipment would only be made available if the army showed flexibility and accepted reductions. The army, however, needed the existing force level to further develop, guard and if necessary fight in the Tine Position that would allow a protracted defence of Copenhagen. The army’s successful defence of the force strength depended on the support of the King and the key conservative politicians. The previous major reduction in 1915 had taken place because the King had given a higher priority to an effort to purchase ammunition. Since autumn 1916 the government
had included representatives of all parties as ministers without portfolio. As a reduction required the consent of all parties, the army could use the conservative minister’s veto. Even if the Conservatives had started to waver, they still considered it necessary that the army accepted a reduction. I.C. Christensen, who represented his party in the government, found it difficult to make up his mind. This was logical because the army’s deployment in direct defence of Copenhagen contradicted what he believed was correct. However, on the other hand a reduction would undermine the mobile forces that he thought necessary.

The army’s defence had consisted of Gørtz’ threat to resign if reductions took place and of Berthelsen using his contacts with the Conservatives to communicate Gørtz’ position and thus reinforce the resolve of the party’s minister. However, in late summer Munch outmanoeuvred the army leaders. Gørtz, who had reached retirement age, left quietly. Tuxen was ordered to take over in spite of only having half a year left before his own retirement. Berthelsen, the next in line for promotion, was replaced as Chief of General Staff and sent away from power and influence in Copenhagen to take Tuxen’s former position as Commanding General in Jutland-Funen. As the new team was unwilling to use contacts to the Conservatives to defend the force level, reductions took place in the autumn of 1917, this time without any compensation in the form of investment in equipment or infrastructure.295

The army was left with a force that totally depended on mobilisation. Its limited strength made it only possible to guard the fortifications and observe the coast. It was too weak to conduct any initial defence. This meant that any defence of Denmark depended on the social-liberal, ‘anti-militaristic’ government’s willingness to mobilise, and to do so early enough for the deployment of ready forces in time to meet the enemy at the place of invasion. It was not very likely to happen. Only a different government might enhance the chances of a timely mobilisation.

The realism of either of these two options was never discussed, not even in the private letters of diaries of the generals. It would probably have been too painful to do so. If the government did not give the army the possibility to mobilise and fight, their life’s work would have been futile. Only the cynical and rather undisciplined outsider Tuxen moved close to breaking the taboo. On 31st December 1914 he had noted that the chances of mobilisation were slim. On 13th February 1916 he concluded in an analysis that the chances that Denmark would be allowed to mobilise were
Politically futile preparation work in the last months of the war: a new massive position reconnoitred between the Tune and Roskilde Fiord Positions and the Fortress.\textsuperscript{301}
slight, and the government might choose to accept the use of Danish territory without fighting. Early January 1917 he discussed the inclination of the government to choose the path of Greece which had chosen to allow belligerent use of its territory – or maybe Luxembourg was the model?296

During the last year of the war the army concentrated on preparing for the time after a change of government or after mobilisation. The prepared extension of the Tune Position along the eastern shore of the Roskilde Fiord had been authorised by the ministry in the same way as further work on the defences south of the Limfjord in Jutland. Timber for the works had been purchased and stored in local depots for use after mobilisation.297 The further development of the Tune Position was being prepared, but had to await mobilisation to start.298

During the last months of the war the General Staff prepared an additional massive field fortified line forward of the Fortress Fronts from the coast of the Sound to the lake ‘Furesøen’ and south to Køge Bay.299 The line followed closely the line of forward works proposed in 1909, but rejected by I.C. Christensen.300 At the end of the war the army had been left without any meaningful dialogue with the government. It thereafter occupied itself with 'pie in the sky'-projects, hoping for a better future.
Concluding observations

The social-liberal government understood the importance of convincing Germany of Denmark’s clear intent to stay neutral. Denmark would not join Germany’s enemies. By doing so, they continued the line of the hated I.C. Christensen.

The Foreign Minister differed from the inner political cabinet members by also realising the value of a clear will to use military force to mark a German-friendly neutral posture, as had Christensen. Otherwise the government was ideologically blinkered to the extent that ruled out effective strategic analysis. It failed to understand the limitations of the belligerent great powers and the resulting possible effect of small neutral power militaries. The government saw all normal military preparations and robust reaction to violations as escalatory and therefore dangerous. However, as a minority government it realised that it had to administer the 1909 defence laws in a superficially and bureaucratically loyal way, wasting money on defence when necessary to keep power.

At the same time the cabinet was closely watching, managing and humouring the service chiefs, these strange, anachronistic gentlemen of an earlier age. Until they were more or less deprived of their instruments, their acts might place Denmark at war with a great power – the ultimate catastrophe.

The army was the government’s main challenge. Its officers deeply distrusted the Defence Minister, knowing his views to be irreconcilable with their own. However, Peter Munch both impressed and charmed the generals. The government-army interaction had the form of civilised bargaining with the army continuously loosing influence and ending up being completely outmanoeuvred in the autumn of 1917.

The army leadership was handicapped by being as incapable as the government of reading the developing strategic situation. Its collective views had been formed ten years earlier under the leadership of General Kühnell and thereafter regressed to the time before him. The generals’ views underlined the high importance of Denmark to both Great Britain and Germany as well as the urgent need of the latter to take control of the country before the arrival of the British. The army’s views were dominated by ethnocentric analysis of Danish military geography (the importance of Copenhagen only) and by the ‘Colonel’s Fallacy’ (seeing only its own weakness and the opponent’s strengths).
The frozen positions of the generals met the ideologically know-all attitude of the social-liberal leaders and reduced political-military interaction to pure bargaining. The I.C. Christensen neutrality defence concept, had it been allowed to guide both legislation and its implementation, might have offered a better framework for effective co-operation, but that possibility capsized in the 1908-09 domestic politics.

The navy chief on the other hand had a clear and sophisticated understanding of the strategic situation in 1914. The only element he like all others completely missed was how submarine warfare would influence Denmark and her navy’s efforts to guard and support the neutrality. To some extent he saw the limitations of the great powers and the options this gave Denmark. If Germany trusted Denmark, military readiness, mobilisation and robust response to violations would reinforce the respect for Danish neutrality and thus the country’s chances of staying outside the conflict. The measures would not provoke a German attack.

Even Kofoed-Hansen had failed to foresee the demands of tactical level violations, and he proved incapable of communicating his developing understanding and robust determination to defend neutrality to the King, the politicians and many of his subordinates. Most of the naval officers remained uncommitted or anglophile, small state, peace-time officers observing with horror and empathy what happened around them. Kofoed-Hansen’s pragmatic strategic views meant that he was regarded as pro-German, and during the war he moved to real sympathy for the German side.

His death in April 1918 not only meant that he was spared the frustration of seeing his admired Germany defeated and collapsing into revolutionary turmoil. He was also spared the likely post-war criticism for having been too pro-German.

By spring 1918 the social-liberal government had established full control and subordination of both armed services without having had to take account of their professional input. This is something highly approved in the value judgements by present day Danish historians, unfortunately without an attempt to grasp that the cost may have been an increased security risk for the country. They know that all went well and see no reason to face the uncertainty and reality of the time.

Most Danish historians and international law experts have seemed to accept Munch’s questionable position that neutral states could not be held responsible for belligerent use of both their resources and their territory.
against opponents. It was apparently proper and logical not to feel obliged to try to deny their use by defence and – if unsuccessful – by destruction. The post-1940-45 occupation arguments have been about the Danish economy supporting Hitler’s war, not about Germany’s immediate and eventual operational use of Danish territory and an intact infrastructure against first Norway and thereafter Great Britain.\textsuperscript{303}

From the start of the war Germany expected a Danish attempt to defend its neutrality against a British landing in Jutland.\textsuperscript{304} The Germans may not have been much impressed by the Danish capabilities to conduct such a defence effectively. Through their constantly briefed embassy they knew, however, that even Jutland was defended. Thus it is unlikely that an even weaker neutrality defence posture would have led to a German intervention during the first two years of the war. A combination of the diplomatic costs of violating Belgian neutrality and the German army’s strained resource situation would probably have prevented it.

With Ludendorff taking power from autumn 1916 this situation gradually changed. Diplomatic costs eventually lost relevance, and the previously frustrated German naval strategists gained the necessary understanding for their wishes and gradually even increased allotment of troops for their plans.

It is an open question if, where and in which form a ‘Sicherungsstellung Nord’ would have been established had the Danish neutrality guard not been in place in the autumn of 1916. The Danish navy posture with the defended mine barrier in the Great Belt created by Kofoed-Hansen demonstrated its buffer value during the 2\textsuperscript{nd} November 1917 Royal Navy ‘sweep’ into the Kattegat. The deterrent value of the Danish defence posture in Zealand meant that the German contingency planners considered a naval bombardment of Copenhagen too risky. Instead they chose the still technologically immature and ineffective aerial bombardment as the only direct way to force any new and more stubborn Danish decision makers to give in. Otherwise they concentrated their operations planning against Jutland and thus vindicated the focus of the 1909 defence priorities. In the spring of 1940 the German intelligence incorrectly still considered Copenhagen Fortress and the Tune Position a potential problem.\textsuperscript{305}

If we really are to make a present day value judgement of the 1909-1918 political-military interaction we should understand and underline that as the side with the final responsibility the politicians should have ensured that the relations did not deteriorate into a ‘Dialogue de sourds’. As in
similar crisis decisions today the politicians should make certain that mis-
understandings are reduced so that the risks to the future of both country
and nation are minimised by the options chosen. Because of their ultimate
responsibility, arrogance and ideological blinkers of politicians are even
less acceptable than those of service leaders.

Erik Scavenius' 1917 contacts to Berlin via the German ambassador
may have reduced the risks of serious combat in Denmark as intended.
However, the consultations and the probably related reductions of the
neutrality guard and freeze on additional defence preparations increased
the probability that Germany would intervene by both supporting the Ger-
man Navy's case for an operation against Denmark to take care of own
strategic requirements and by reducing both the diplomatic costs and the
required German Army troop levels.

In order to get the maximum security benefits from contacts, the
government should have acted differently. It should have reinforced the
army presence at Esbjerg and in the North Jutland ports and deployed
navy units - e.g. submarines - to a Kattegat station such as Aarhus. This
would have sent a clear signal to the German Navy. A stronger Danish
army presence in the southern part of Jutland combined with continuing
general defence preparations would have reinforced the arguments of the
German Army. However, by doing so the social-liberal leadership would
have to acknowledge that military capabilities could be useful even for a
small state.

During his many meetings with the German Ambassador, Erik Scave-
nius did nothing to change the envoy's always expressed opinion that the
pro-German neutrality line depended on a continuation of the social-li-
beral government with him as its Foreign Minister. When the social-liberal
leaders discovered I. C. Christensen's pre-1909 clandestine contacts with
the German General Staff Chief, the Foreign Minister might have used this
information to attempt to convince the ambassador that Danish policy
would survive a change of governing party. By not using the knowledge
that even a government led by the loathed Christensen was most likely to
continue the pro-German line unchanged, the government accepted un-
necessary future risks for Denmark.

The history of the Danish armed forces from 1909 to 1918 became
dominated by four impressive personalities: Kühnell, I.C.Christensen, Ko-
foed-Hansen and Munch. Two of them were forced to leave the scene
before the story actually started. Kühnell died in 1908 leaving his ideas
to be administered by well-meaning disciples. Christensen withered as a political force during 1908-09.

Kofoed-Hansen acted forcefully within the same broad understanding of Denmark’s situation as Christensen, adapting quickly to the new situation of 5th August 1914 by defining and more or less taking control of the country's defence posture during the first year of the war. Thereafter the war touched Denmark in a way he had not foreseen and therefore not prepared his navy properly to handle.

From autumn 1915 Munch gradually took over effective control, enforcing his rule by dividing, always with his distinctive blend of politeness, charm, patience and equilibrium. He never doubted that he was right and his actions justified. He had let himself be well educated in his first two years as minister, listening to Berthelsen’s repeated and extended lecturing and Kofoed-Hansen’s attempts to convince him.

Peter Munch exploited the mistrust between the King and Kofoed-Hansen and the reaction to the admiral’s authoritarian style among senior naval officers, used Kofoed-Hansen’s ego against the army, separated the monarch from his army, sowed disagreement among Conservatives and weakened the link between the key Conservative army supporters and the army, manoeuvred to keep Christensen embarrassed and away from real influence, used Tuxen’s cynicism against Berthelsen, and finally got full control over the navy on the admiral’s death in April 1918.

As part of his work as chairman of the post-war defence commission, the historian Munch thereafter led the writing and editing of the official history of the Danish armed forces before and during the neutrality guard period. As in his later diaries and memoirs the description of events of the 1922 ‘Report’ with its comprehensive attached documentation was controlled elegantly by omissions. All the information included was correct, but significant relevant information was left out. The Report has been left unchallenged to this day.
Note on sources
Literature and published sources:
See notes.

Other sources:

From the National Archive: 'Rigsarkivet'
Krigsministeriets Arkiv
Marineministeriets Arkiv
Generalstabens Arkiv (especially Krigsføringsdepotet, Operationssektionens Arkiv and Fæstningssektionens Arkiv)
Flådens Overkommandos Arkiv
Flådens Stabs Arkiv
1. Generalkommandos Arkiv
2. Generalkommandos Arkiv
Ingeniørkommandoens Arkiv
1. Divisions Arkiv
2. Divisions Arkiv
3. Divisions Arkiv
Bornholms Værns Arkiv
Privatarkiv: Wilhelm Gørtz: 1914-17 Militærkorrespondance med Generalløjtnant A. P. Tuxen
Privatarkiv: Holten Frederik Castenschiold: Dagbøger
Privatarkiv: Berthel Palle Berthelsen: Udkast til erindringer 1857-1918 m.m

From the Royal Library: 'Det Kongelige Bibliotek'
A.P. Tuxens Privatarkiv
Notes

1 Developed from the Contribution to the May 2007 Round-Table Conference: ‘The Danish Straits and German Naval Power 1905-1918’ with the title ‘The strategic views and actions of the Danish navy and army chiefs 1909-1918’

2 http://www.thm.dk/dkhist/pics/49.jpg

3 The Japanese victory over the ‘white’ Russians had shocked the fundamentally racist establishments everywhere in the world. It impressed and inspired the German geopolitical theorist Karl Haushofer, who had been sent to Japan in 1908 to study its Army. Five years later he published „Dai Nihon, Betrachtungen über Groß-Japans Wehrkraft, Weltstellung und Zukunft“ in München.

4 The most explicit pessimistic expression of Social-Darwinist world views has been found in August Tuxen’s letters to Vilhelm Gørtz.


6 For the best recent analysis see: Jens Ole Christensen: ‘“Lige langt fra militarismens overmodige dasken på sabelskeden som fra selvopgivelsens jammerlighed”. I.C. Christensen og dansk sikkerheds-, udenrigs- og forsvars-politik 1901-09.’ In Historisk Tidsskrift, Volume 105/2, Cph 2005

7 http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/ce/IC_Christensen.png/200px-IC_Christensen.png


10 As Minister of Defence, he was the political head of two separate ministries: the army ‘Ministry of War’ and the ‘Ministry of the Navy’.


From Gerhard Gross’ presentation at the 30–31 May Round-Table Conference: ‘The Danish Straits and German Naval Power 1905-1918’ with the title ‘The strategic views and actions of the Danish navy and army chiefs 1909-1918’

Made by 2nd Squadron especially to brief the new Navy Commander.

The last and only attempt to build an international class battleship after 1864 was the construction of the 5.480 ton ‘Helgoland’ from 1876 to 1879. The first true battleship, the HMS Royal Sovereign, launched in 1891, was of 14.150 tons. At that time the Danish navy’s wish was to develop a flotilla of coastal defence monitors of approximately 3.500 tons.

For the type of navalist arguments used in a small power, see the editor Commander J. H. Schultz article ‘Vor Flaades Tilstand ved Aarhundredes Slutning’, in ‘Tidsskrift for Søvæsen’ 1900. Without any arguments related to their very different roles and geographical conditions the Danish Navy is compared to the Swedish and Norwegian navies.

Translation of the Danish rank ‘Kaptajn’ would depend on the officer’s seniority due to the span of the positions occupied by that rank in the Danish Navy (e.g. captain of a larger vessel or flotilla commander of a larger group of torpedo boats). The navy had three ranks below flag officer ranks for regular officers: Løjnant, Kaptajn and Kommandør (Navy Captain).


Marineministeriet No. 2562 of 25-04-1918 to Flaadens Overkommando.

Andrew Lambert: ‘The German North Sea Islands, the Kiel Canal and the Danish Narrows in Royal Navy thinking and planning, 1905-1918’. Paper for the May 2007 Round-Table Conference ‘The Danish Straits and German Naval Power 1905-1918.’


Søløjtnantsselskabets Arkiv: ‘Harpaks’ (Kaptajn H.L.Wenck) prisopgave til Sølieutenantselskabet i Decbr. 1910 ‘At give en Oversigt over, hvor- ledes Torpedobaade bor anvendes i Krig, saavel strategisk som tak- tisk set, og de heraf flydende Krav, særlig for det søgaaende Materiels Vedkommende, samt at belyse denne Fremstilling ved Eksempler, der
fortrinsvis tager Sigte paa Krigsførelsen i Nordsøen, men tillige berører Forholdene i vore Farvande.’ pp.100-123.

‘Sølieutenantsselskabet’.

http://www.navalhistory.dk/images/officererne/Wenck_Henri.jpg
http://www.navalhistory.dk/Danish/Skibene/S/Soeridderen(1911).htm

Flaadens Stab Fortroligt No. 103 of 16-11-1911 to Marineministeriet and No. 110 of 04-12-1911 to Sølieutenant-Selstabet.

Marinens Bibliotek (from Soofficersforeningen)


Akten betreffend Dänemark. PG 77555, sp.1404: Admiralstab der Marine, Denkschrift, Ganz Geheim, O-Sache. ‘Der Fall, dass Dänemark auf Seiten unserer Feinde tritt ...’ of 02-09-1916


Flaadens Stab Fortroligt No. 16 of 30-01-1912 to Marineministeriet.

Den flydende Defension Fortroligt no. 30 of 02-02-1912 to Den kommanderende Admiral.

http://www.navalhistory.dk/Danish/Skibene/H/Havmanden(1912).htm

Flaadens Stab Fortroligt No. 69 of 07-06-1912 to Den kommanderende Admiral.

Only the covering letter found: Flaadens Stab Fortroligt No. 71 of 08-06-1912 to Den kommanderende Admiral.

Krigsministeriets 5. kt. Pakke no. 28 ‘Arkiv for Forsvarsrådet’ med notater til mødet 16-11-1912.

http://www.holtenau-info.de/history/kanal2.htm

Royal Decree No. 293 of 20. December 1912 ‘angaaende visse Bestemmelser med Hensyn til Danmarks Neutralitet i Tilfælde af Krig imellem fremmede Magter’.


Flaadens Stab Fortroligt no.152 of 15-07-1913 to Marineministeriet.

Only the covering letter has been found as: Flaadens Stab Fortroligt no.114 of 02-06-1913 to Den kommanderende Admiral.
Flaadens Stab Fortroligt no.225 of 11-11-1913 to Chefen for Generalstaben.

Den kommanderende Admiral O. Fortroligt no. 38 of 28-07-1914 to Marineministeriet and Marineministeriet Fortroligt n. 4227 of 29-08-1914 to Den kommanderende Admiral.

Photo from Bornholm Museum.

As for the dates when the boats entered service see: http://www.navalhistory.dk/Danish/Flaadelister/Typevis/Ubaade.htm.

Flaadens Stab Fortroligt of 18-09-1920: 'Den udrustede Flaades Virksomhed under Sikringsperioden 1/8 1914 – 31/3 1919'


Flaadens Stab Fortroligt of 18-09-1920: 'Den udrustede Flaades Virksomhed under Sikringsperioden 1/8 1914 – 31/3 1919'.

In the Danish public and political debate at the time, ‘militarism’ not only meant military domination in the organisation of state and society. The term was also used by the political and intellectual Left as a derogative to taint any idea that military structures might contribute to the security of the country. The new growing urban intellectual elite that dominated the social-liberal party considered ‘anti-militarism’ - a rejection of everything military and all defence efforts - a central part of being a modern, progressive person.

From Viggo Sjøqvists ‘Peter Munch’ Cph. 1976.
somhed under Sikringsperioden 1/8 1914 – 31/3 1919’.  
53 Den kommanderende Admiral Fortroligt O. no. 48 af 01-08-1914 to Hr. Kaptajn Bojesen. R. af D. Chef for den til Smaalandsfarvandet detacherede Styrke’. 
54 ‘Overkommandoordre nr. 2’ Fortroligt of 01-08-1914.  
55 Strengt fortroligt ‘Oversigt over Minerne af Typerne 8, 9 og 10’ i Nordre A-spærring efter ordre.  
57 Flaadens Stab Fortroligt of 18-09-1920: ‘Den udrustede Flades Virksomhed under Sikringsperioden 1/8 1914 – 31/3 1919’  
61 Ragnar Rasmussen: ‘Fall J – de tyske operationsplaner mod Danmark’ (to be published). Rasmussen quotes ‘Besprechungen Kiel, Dokument 70-74’ 10-11-1916, where Danish mining of the Little Belt was considered one of the four distinctive cases.  
62 Stationschefen i Lille Bælt Fortroligt Nr. 1351 of 10-06-1918 to Flaadens Overkommando. 
64 http://www.navalhistory.dk/Danish/Skibene/H/Hjaelperen(1891).htm 
65 http://www.navalhistory.dk/Danish/Skibene/L/Lossen(1911).htm
Flaadens Overkommando Fortroligt O. no. 95 of 06-08-1914 to Chefen for 2. Eskadre.

Strengt fortroligt af 07-08-1914: 'Skriftlig Gengivelse af Hovedpunkterne i mundtligt Direktiv (pr. Telefon til Korsør) fra Chefen for Flaadens Overkommando til Chefen for 2. Eskadre den 7/8 1914 kl. 12 M.D.'

Chefen for 2. Eskadre Fortroligt No. 19 of 11-08-1914 to Flaadens Overkommando.

Chefen for 2. Eskadre Fortroligt No. 184 of 07-09-1914 to Flaadens Overkommando.

http://www.milhist.dk/andre/miner/kofoed.jpg


Marinens Bibliotek (from Søofficersforeningen).

Tage Kaastad (red.): ’Ove Rodes dagbøger 1914-1918.’ Aarhus 1972, the diary entries of 20-10 and 21-10-1914.

Flaadens Overkommando Fortroligt No. O. 536 of 21-10-1914 to Chefen for 2. Eskadre.
From the poster celebrating the 1915 constitution with pictures of the ministers.


Flaadens Stab Fortroligt of 18-09-1920: 'Den udrustede Flaades Virksomhed under Sikringsperioden 1/8 1914 – 31/3 1919'

Chefen for 2. Eskadre, Kystforsvarsskibet "Olfert Fischer" Storebælt, Strængt Fortroligt 08-11-1914 til Den kommanderende Admiral.


Referat af Konference i Flaadens Overkommando 05-09-1914.

Flaadens Overkommandos O. No. 90 of 06-08-1914 'Overkommando-ordre Nr. 4'.

Referat af konference i Flaadens Overkommando 05-09-1914.

Den flydende Defension Løbe Nr. 428 of 14-09-1914 to Chefen for Hærens Overkommando.

Chefen for 1. Eskadre Fortroligt No. 379 of 22-09-1914 to Flaadens Overkommando.

Attached to Chefen for 1. Eskadre Fortroligt No. 379 of 22-09-1914 to Flådens Overkommando.

Flaadens Operative Kommando No. O. 479 & 480 of 05-10-1914 to Chefen for 1. Eskadre og Chefen for Undervandsbaadslotillen.


Flaadens Stab Fortroligt af 18-09-1920: 'Den udrustede Flaades Virksomhed under Sikringsperioden 1/8 1914 – 31/3 1919'

Chefen for Undervandsbådsflotillen no. 183 of 27-10-1914 to Flaadens Overkommando.

Marineministeriet no. 6616 of 31-10-1914 to Flaadens Overkommando. 'Kommissionen til Undersøgelse og Overvejelse af Hærens og Flaadens fremtidige Ordning, Bilag XVI, 'Flaadens Virksomhed under Verdenskrigen' ' pp.227-279

V. Jøhnke’s diary notes in Tage Kaarsted: 'Flåden under første verdens-
The 'E.11' side: Richard Compton-Hall 'Submarines at War 1914-1918'
The 'Havmanden' side: Chefen for Undervandsbaaden Havmanden Strengt fortroligt, L.Nr. 10 of 19-10-1914 to Chefen for Undervands-
baadsflotillen & Flaadens Overkommando Strengt Fortroligt af 19-10-
1914 kl. 9.45 Efm to Chefen for 1. Eskadre.

This paper is too short to give a narrative of events. The official clas-
sified report of the navy: Flaadens Stab Fortroligt of 18-09-1920: 'Den
udrustede Flaades Virksomhed under Sikringsperioden 1/8 1914 – 31/3
1919', gives a minute by minute account. This, however, must be sup-
plemented by the reports from the involved ships and authorities as
well as the drafting of the Ministry of the Navy press release.

They were relatively relaxed. One example is Flaadens Overkommando
Fortroligt no.O.677 of 04-12-1914 to Chefen for 1. Eskadre (found in
the files of the torpedo boat 'Søulven', the key Danish vessel involved
in the E.13 incident). If foreign ships were inspected or arrested by bel-
Ligerents in Danish territorial waters, the reaction would be limited to a protest. No force should be used.

The term tactical violation is used here for a deliberate violation of the neutrality normally decided at unit or tactical HQ level as a direct response to a developing combat situation (at the land border, at sea or in the air). The term operational level violation is used for a pre-planned act aimed at getting temporary use of a part of the neutral state’s air space, sea or land territory. A strategic violation is seen as a preplanned, act aiming at either forcing the neutral state to operate in permanent support of the violating belligerent or seeking lasting use of either the complete neutral state territory or a very significant part of the territory.

111 Den flydende Defension no. 1069 of 18-08-1915. no. 1124 of 29-08-1915 and no. 1326 of 05-10-1915 to Flaadens Overkommando & Marineministeriets no. 5319 of 07-10-1915 to Flaadens Overkommando.


115 Den flydende Defension Strengt fortroligt 'Defensionsordre No. 1' of 01-01-1917


117 'Overkommandoordre Nr. 92'

118 http://www.navalhistory.dk/images/officererne/Evers_Anton_FM.jpg

119 Flaadens Stab Fortroligt af 18-09-1920: 'Den udrustede Flaades Virksomhed under Sikringsperioden 1/8 1914 – 31/3 1919'


122 Flaadens Stab Fortroligt af 18-09-1920: 'Den udrustede Flaades Virksomhed under Sikringsperioden 1/8 1914 – 31/3 1919'

Flaadens Overkommando Strengt fortroligt O. 342 af 27-04-1916 'Overkommando-Meddeelse Nr. 71'

Sketch attached to Den flydende Defension Strengt fortroligt No. 149 of 11-02-1916 to Flaadens Overkommando.

Letter from general Gørtz (the Commander of the Army) to general Tuxen (army commander west of the Great Belt) of 24th April 1916.

The admiral later confirms his analysis in a conversation with Gørtz, see letter from Gørtz to Tuxen of 24-11-1916.


Flaadens Overkommando O.4430 of 18-08-1916 to Flaadens Overkommando. Chefen for Undervandsbaadsflotillen U-No. 362 of 01-09-1916 to Flaadens Overkommando.


Gerhard Gross: 'Case J'. Paper for the May 2007 Round-Table Conference 'The Danish Straits and German Naval Power 1905-1918.'

General Gørtz’ letter to General Tuxen covering 03- and 04-02-1917
Kofoed-Hansen’s analysis as quoted in Gøtz’s letter to Tuxen of 10-02-1917.

Overgeneralen Fortroligt O. No. 298 of 07-05-1917 to Forsvarsministeren.


http://www.skovheim.org/worldwide/baltic/hilfsschiff/hilfsschiff.htm


According to the Swedish War Archive (‘Krigsarkivet’), the secret files of the Gothenburg naval force (‘Göteborgseskadern’ or ‘Göteborgsavdelningen’ at different times) unfortunately have not survived.


From Esbjerg Byhistoriske Arkiv.

Orlogsmuseet.

Lyngvig Fyr, No. 63 of 01-09-1917 to Flaadens Overkommando.

Chefen for Absalon No. 197 of 02-09-1917 to Stationsofficeren.

Stationsofficeren i Esbjerg No. 259 of 02-09-1917 to Flaadens Overkommando.

Udskrift af Ulfsborg Hind Herreders Politiprotokol.
Chefen for Absalon No. 225 of 02-10-1917 to Flaadens Overkommando: ‘Maanedsrappor Nr. 9’
Manuskript af strandfoged P. Chr. Dahl.

Udenrigsministerets letter to Den kommanderende Ardmiral of 31-10-1917 with the English Note.

Forsvarets Billedsamling.

http://mysn.qxl.dk/accdb/ViewItem.asp?IDI=509274864

Orlogsmuseet.


http://www.pourlemerite.org/wwi/navy/nergershipwolf.jpg


Forsvarets Billedsamling.

Chefen for 2. Eskadre Fortroligt No. 1345 of 18-11-1918 to Flaadens Overkommando.

Chefen for 2. Eskadre Fortroligt No. 1348 of 19-11-1918 to Flaadens Overkommando.

First Lieutenant Th. Heiberg of 22-11-1918 to the Commander of Skjold. From the ‘Sværdfisker’ accident file.

Chefen for 2. Eskadre No. 1391 of 27-11-1918 to Flaadens Overkommando.

Telegram of 28-11-1918 from the editing board of ‘Berlingske Tidende’. Marineministeriet letter of 05-12-1918 to Flaadens Overkommando.

From the ‘Sværdfisker’ accident file.

From Marinens Bibliotek. It is not clear if the photo was taken during the post-Armistice work.
Flaadens Overkommando Fortroligt O. No. 1082 of 21-12-1918 to Marineministeriet. Flaadens Overkommando No. 51 of 15-01-1919 to Vintereskadren.


Marinens Bibliotek.

Generalstabens Taktiske Afdeling

According to information of 13-08-2007 from Dr. Willem Klinkert.

See the later army commander W.W.Prior’s ‘Generalløjtnant A.A.B. Kühnell’ Cph 1942

From Forsvarets Portrætsamling.

Kühnell had prepared the promotion by the extraordinarily positive annual promotion report on Gørtz in December 1904 (to be found in the 2nd Zealand Brigade archive).

See Gørtz version of his dependence of that legacy in his letter to Tuxen of 04-12-1916.

From Forsvarets Portrætsamling.

Generalstabsøvelsen 1911 (Fortroligt no. 26 of April 1911)

W.W.Prior ‘Generalløjtnant A.A.B. Kühnell’ Cph 1942

The profiles of the key persons and their mindset are based on Berthelsen’s unpublished memoirs as well as the correspondence between Gørtz and Tuxen as well as the Berthelsen side of the correspondence with Tuxen. All letters to Tuxen can now be found in the Royal Danish Library. Berthelsen’s memoirs and the letters to Gørtz are now in their personal files in the Danish State Archive.

For a clear example of Tuxen’s open mind and Gørtz’s energetic response to his heresy see Tuxen’s letter of 19-04-1915 and Gørtz immediate response from the next day.

From Forsvarets Portrætsamling.

Chefen for Flaadens Stab no. 7 of 06-01-1911 to Chefen for Generalstaben (responding to Generalstaben Fortroligt C. no. 180 of 18-11-1909).

From Bornholms Lokalhistoriske Samling.


From Bornholms Lokalhistoriske Samling.

3. Division Fortroligt M. No. 54 of 09-02-1911 to Chefen for 1. Generalkommandodistrikt.

Chefen for Kystartilleriregimentet Fortroligt no. 462 af 06-04-1911 to Artillerigeneralen.

Den flydende Defension Fortroligt no. 30 of 02-02-1912 & no. 91 af 05-03-1912 to Den kommanderende Admiral.
Flaadens Stab of 06-05-1912 ‘Bemærkninger til “Overvejelser og Forslag vedrørende Patrouilletjenesten paa Københavns Søfront”.

2. Generalkommando Fortroligt M. No. M.44 of 24-02-1912 to Krigsministeriet.

Gørtz brev til Tuxen 03-03-1912.

2. Generalkommando of 02-08-1914 with Plan (12-08-1912) for ‘Forlæggelse af jydske Korps to Esbjerg’. According to the plan, the Jutland Force minus 15th Reserve Infantry Regiment was concentrated at Esbjerg.

Kaptajn V. L. Lorck’s Fortrolige Notat of juni 1912 ‘Den Jydske Hærstyrke’


Attached to ‘Forholdsordren til 2. Generalkommando ofaf 02-08-1914: Plan of 12-08-1912 for ’Forlæggelse af jydske Korps til Esbjerg’


Forsvarsrådets møde 09-11-1912: Bilag 7: ‘Hærens formering af sikringsstyrke’.

This paper does not describe the development of the relatively strong, multi layer Copenhagen air defence system from 1915 onwards.

Forsvarsrådets møde 16-11-1912: Bilag 14: CH/GST om de ‘... føleligste mangler ved vore forsvarsforanstaltninger.’

It is likely that Berthelsen had a role in inspiring the collection. This,
however, cannot be documented by the existing research. His diary has not survived and his unfinished memoirs do not cover the period. He was, however, the soul and catalyst of all other volunteer defence efforts during those years.

A good description can be found in the Defence Minister's memoirs: Klaus Berntsen: 'Erindringer fra Rigsdags og Ministeraar.' Cph 1925, pp.224-230. Key documents printed in: 'Beretning afgiven af Kommissionen Til Undersøgelse og Overvejelse af Hærens og Flaadens fremtidige Ordnung', Cph 1922, Bilag XIII: 'Skrivelser mellem Komiteen for den frivillige Forsvarsindsamling og Forsvarsministeren'

Den designerede Overgeneral Fortrolig of 07-02-1913 to Krigsministeriet.

Gørtz' letter of 16th-20th January 1913 to Tuxen.

Ingeniørgeneralen Fortroligt no. 1356 of 31-07-1914 to Den designerede Overgeneral.

Fortifikatorisk Arbejdsarmeringsplan for Kjøbenhavns Søfront sent by 2. Ingeniørdirektorat on 31-07-1914 and returned with Frontingeniør-kommandoen paa Søfronten No. 53 of 31-08-1914 to Armeingeniør-kommandoen.


Arméingeniørkommandoen Fortroligt no. 74 of 05-08-1914 to Overkommandoen.

Krigsministeriet Fortroligt M. no. 2365 af 02-08-1914 to 2. Generalkommando.

2. Generalkommando Generalkommandobefaling no. 11 of 04-08-1914.


Palle Berthelsens Privatarkiv: "Mit Forhold under Sikringsperioden".

3 Division Fortroligt M. no. 197 of 15-08-1914 to Overkommandoen Forsvarets Billedsamling.

Fæstningsartillerirerimentet Fortroligt nr. 102 of 01-08-1914 to Generalsinspektøren for Artilleriet.

Kystartilleriregimentet Fortroligt no. 1252 of 01-08-1914 to Den designerede Overgeneral.
Generalsinspektøren for Artilleriet Fortroligt Ar. no. 776 of 01-08-1914 to Chef en for Generalstaben.


Berthel Palle Berthelsens: "Mit Forhold under Sikringsperioden".

Tårnby Lokalhistoriske Samling.

Frontingeniørkommandoen paa Søfronten T. no. 20 of 25-08-1914 to Arméingeniørkommandoen. Arméingeniørkommandoen I.K. no. 706 of 08-09-1914 to Overkommandoen.

Arméingeniørkommandoen Fortroligt I.K. no. 590 of 28-08-1914 to Overkommandoen.


F.L. Smidth of 09-12-1914 to Chef en for Generalstaben. 'Kr. 166.601,09 fra indsamlingen frigives fra Kjøbenhavns Handelsbank af det paa Kontoen for "Indsamlingen til Forstærkning af Københavns Nordfront"' Frontkommandoen på Nordfronten Fortroligt M. no. 281 af 26-10-1914 to Overkommandoen. Frontkommandoen paa Nordfronten Fortroligt M. no.151 of 10-03-1915 to Overkommandoen (gives a complete list of the works constructed of concrete)

http://gebirgskrieg.heim.at/5145.htm
http://www.waffenhq.de/panzer/dickebertha.html


See Tuxen's letter to Gørtz at 15-12-1914 ‘... Nu laver Du en Tune-Stilling; det er i alle Tilfælde et alvorligt Arbejde, et Værk, som der er en Mening i, om man saa kan have de Tusinder af Indvendinger at frem-sætte mod det ...’

Tage Kaasted (red.): 'Ove Rodes dagbøger 1914-1918.' Aarhus 1972.

Tage Kaarsted (red.): 'C. Th. Zahles Dagbøger 1914-1917', Aarhus 1974, s. 22-23

Gørtz Privatarkiv. Afskedsansøgningssagen i januar 1915.
Berthelsens Privatarkiv: "Mit Samarbejde med Generalløjtnant Gørtz under Sikringsperioden".

The first indication found is in Berthelsen's letter to Tuxen og 96-06-1915, where he argues against sending too much old artillery to Jutland. The extra artillery was needed in the new forward positions being considered.

Generalmajor Holten Frederik Castenschiolds privatarkiv. 'Dagbog 1912-17'. Berthel Palle Berthelsens privatarkiv: Udkast til erindringer 1857-1918 m.m

From Forsvarets Portrætsamling.


235 'Forslag til en Stilling over Vallerup-Ægholm-Krabbesholm i Horns Herred' of 23-10-1915 from First Lieutenant Flemming Topsøe of Arméingenjøerkommandoen.


237 The logic behind the move is described in Overkommandoen Fortroligt O. no. 192 of 11-02-1915 to Krigsministeriet, where the army leadership is arguing for maintaining the strength of the neutrality guard.

238 Owned by Ib Faurby.

239 Colonel Louis Nielsen, one of Kühnells General Staff Course students later to become a controversial Chief of General Staff.

240 2nd Division Fortroligt M.B. no. 2292 of 27-05-1915 to Overkommandoen, M.B. no. 2338 of 02-06-1915 to Generalstaben and M.B. no. 3606 of 10-11-1915 to Overkommandoen.

241 Owned by Ib Faurby.

242 For the Netherlands see Willem Klinkert: ‘Threatened neutrality: Holland between the German Army and the British Navy’. Paper for the May 2007 Round-Table Conference ‘The Danish Straits and German Naval Power 1905-1918.’


Palle Berthelsens privatarkiv: "Mit Forhold under Sikringsperioden (Verdenskrigen fra 25/7 14 til Vaabenstilstanden").

245 From a January 1916 construction status report.

246 Overkommandoen Fæstningssektions notat 25-03-1916.

247 Hærens Overkommando Fortroligt of 19-04-1916 to Flaadens Overkommando.

248 2. Batallion Fortroligt no. 1274 of 27-04-1916 to Sydfronten (forwarded to the Army Headquarters the next day).

249 Letter from Gørtz to Tuxen of 28-04-1916.


251 Letters from Berthelsen to Tuxen of 17-05-1916 and from Gørtz to Tuxen of 18-05-1916.


From Forsvarets Billedsamling.

255 Overkommandoen Fortroligt O. no. 371 of 09-06-1916 to 2nd Division (now being informed) and Chefen for 1. Division Fortroligt B. no. 126 of 10-06-1916 to Overkommandoen.

256 Overkommandoen Fortroligt O. nr. 390 of 17-06-1916 to 2. Division.

From Forsvarets Portrætsamling.

258 Flaadens Overkommando Fortroligt O. no. 528 of 16-06-1916 to Hærens Overkommando.


261 Chefen for 1. Division Fortroligt B. no. 64 of 18-03-1917 to Overkommandoen, with the General Staff’s response.
Chefen for Søtransportvæsenet Fortroligt no. 38 of 26-04-1917 to Hærens Overkommando.

262 Overkommandoen Fortroligt O. no. 443 of 12-07-1916 to Chefen for 2. Division.

263 Frontartillerikommandoen paa Søfronten T. no. 2113 of 24-06-1916 to Arméartillerikommandoen.
Hærens tekniske Korps K. no. 2279 of 24-06-1916 to Overkommandoen.
Overkommandoen Fortroligt F. no.1557 of 30-08-1916 to 2. Division.
Arméartillerikommandoen Fortroligt A..K. –o no. 524 of 06-09-1916 to Overkommandoen.
Overkommandoen Fortroligt F. no 1803 of 29-09-1916 to 2. Division.
Mosedebatteri Fortroligt no. 79 of 11-12-1916 to Chefen for 24. Batallion.
Arméartillerikommandoen Fortroligt A.K.-o no.8 of 04-01-1917 to Overkommandoen.

264 From Arméingeniørkommandoens Arkiv. Særlige Sager, Tunestillingen.

265 Overkommandoen Fortroligt O. no. 555 of 29-08-1916 to 2. Division.
2. Division Fortroligt B. no. 238 of 22-09-1916 to Overkommandoen.
Frontkommandoen paa Vestfronten Fortroligt af 01-02-1917 ‘Frontbefaling Nr. 1.’

266 Tuxen's letters of 26-02 and 24-04-1915.
267 Tuxen's letters of 24-04, 23-10 and 19-11-1915.
268 Berthelsen's letter of 30-06-1916.
269 Den højstbefalende paa Fyen No. 325 of 07-09-1916.
270 Ibid.
271 2. Generalkommando Strængt Fortroligt F. No. 186 of 12-09-1916 to Overkommandoen.
272 Overkommandoen Strængt Fortroligt O. No. 638 of 26-09-1916 to 2. Generalkommando.
273 2. Generalkommando Strængt Fortroligt F. No. 204 of 29-09-1916 to Den højstbefalende paa Fyen.
Den højstbefalende paa Fyen Strengt Fortroligt without no. of 10-10-1916 to 2. Generalkommando.
2. Generalkommando Strengt Fortroligt


277 Chefen for 6. Regiment Fortroligt without no. of 09-12-1916 to 2. Generalkommando.

2. Generalkommando Strængt Fortroligt F No. 285 of 24-12-1916 to Overkommandoen.

278 Forsvarets Portrætsamling.


280 Tuxen's letter to Gørtz of 06-09-1916. Tuxen had time to follow the very open German military press closely and kept Gørtz informed.

281 Gørtz' letter to Tuxen of 20-09-1916.


Den kommanderende Admiral Fortroligt no. 73 of 06-11-1916 to Forsvarsministeren. One Danish agent was one of the leaders of the minority, H.P. Hansen (see Gørtz’ letter to Tuxen of 05-05-1916 with an order not to use the names of leading agents).

283 Gørtz’ letter to Tuxen of 20-09-1916.


286 Tuxen’s letter to Gørtz of 01- and 02-02-1917.

287 Gørtz' letter to Tuxen of 03-02-1917 and Tuxen's response letter of 08-02-1917. Castenschiold's diary entry of 08-02-1917.

288 Gørtz' letter to Tuxen of 10-02-1917 and Tuxen's response of 15-02-1917.

289 Overgeneralen Fortroligt O. no. 298 of 07-05-1917 to Forsvarsministeren.

From Gerhard Gross’ presentation at the 30-31 May Round-Table Conference: ‘The Danish Straits and German Naval Power 1905-1918’ with the title ‘The strategic views and actions of the Danish navy and army chiefs 1909-1918’


‘Dänemark bildet dabei die erste, fast schon erreichte Etappe.’ Captain (Navy) Reinhold von Fischer-Lossainen to the Navy State Secretary from Stockholm 20-12-1917.


Letters from Gørtz to Tuxen from 14-07, 25-07, 03-08 and 04-08-1917.

Berthel Palle Berthelsens Privatarkiv: ‘Mit Samarbejde med Generalløjtnant Gørtz under Sikringsperioden’ and ‘Mit Forhold under Sikringsperioden (Verdenskrigen fra 25/7 14 til Vaabenstilstanden)’.

Tuxen’s letter to Gørtz of 31-12-1914.

2. Generalkommando Fortroligt F. No. 47 of 13-02-1916 to Overkommandoen.

Tuxen’s letter to Gørtz of 05-01-1917.

I have chosen not to cover the development of the Roskilde Fiord project. The need had been realised in mid 1915. However, the army had chosen to await the approval of Tune Position funding before raising the matter with the ministry. For an engineer evaluation see: Captain L.B.Blot Jørgensen, Chefen for 7. Ingeniørkompagni of 24-08-1917 to Ingeniørregimentet.

Ingeniørregimentets Fortroligt T. no. 388 of 26-06-1918 to Overkommandoen.

Kommandanten i København Fortroligt B. no. 248 of 09-10-1918 to Overkommandoen.


Kommandanten i København (Lemcke) Fortroligt B. No. 248 of 09-10-1918 to Overkommandoen.

A brilliant example is Bo Lidegaard: ‘Dansk Udenrigspolitiks Historie 4.

Fortunately Jens Andersen: ‘Tysk invasionsforsvar i Danmark 1940-45.’ Cph 2007 is contributing to improving the basis for such a debate.


From the 1915 Constitution poster.

Beretning fra Kommissionen til Undersøgelse og Overvejelse af Hæren og Flaadens fremtidige Ordning, København 1922.